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Cybersecurity regulation presents an interesting quandary where, 
because private entities possess the best information about threats 
and defenses, legislatures do—and should—deliberately encode 
regulatory capture into the rulemaking process. This relatively 
uncommon approach to administrative law, which I describe as 
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, involves the combination 
of two legislative approaches to engaging private entities’ expertise. 
This Article explores the wisdom of those choices by comparing the 
efficacy of such private sector engaged regulation with that of a more 
traditional, directive mode of regulating cybersecurity adopted by the 
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state legislatures. My analysis suggests that a blend of these two 
modes of regulating is superior to either method alone. 
Federal regulation of cybersecurity through HIPAA, Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, and the Federal Trade Commission’s enforcement 
heavily involves private organizations subject to the regulation in the 
establishment of the actual practices and standards to which those 
organizations are held. By contrast, the state cybersecurity laws—a 
form of disclosure-based regulation that de facto achieves directive 
regulation—detail specific standards developed without industry 
input. 
This Article compares the efficacy of those two modes of 
regulating using a mixed-methods empirical approach. Qualitative 
data based on interviews with Chief Information Security Officers 
(CISOs) at leading multinational corporations details the practical 
effects of how regulation drives cybersecurity practices. Analysis of 
quantitative data describing security breach incidents reveals that a 
blend of the two types of regulation is substantially more effective at 
preventing such incidents than is either method alone. These results 
provide insight into ways to mitigate the risks of deliberate regulatory 
capture while still leveraging the unique knowledge private entities 
have about what are the most salient cybersecurity threats and 
defenses. 
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Several years ago, while driving back from a job interview in 
Washington, D.C., I recall receiving (on my hands-free-enabled 
mobile phone) an “urgent” phone call from the issuing bank of my 
primary credit card. Upon returning the call, I learned that my credit 
card had been compromised and a new card needed to be issued—
immediately. As a young cybersecurity scholar, I was curious and, 
inquiring further, was able to learn only that one of the payment 
processors with which the bank worked had experienced a massive 
security breach, and it was under investigation. 
In 2008, payment card processor Heartland Payment Systems 
experienced a security breach1 that resulted in the compromise of 
approximately 130 million consumer payment card records.2 The 
compromise was the result of malicious software placed into 
Heartland’s network that extracted the data describing payment card 
transactions and transmitted that information, including sensitive 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Paul McNamara, Banks Warn Customers as Debit-Card Processor Acknowledges 
Breach . . . ”Larger than TJX?”, NETWORKWORLD (Jan. 20, 2009, 10:03 AM), http://www.network 
world.com/community/node/37510. 
 2. Incident 1518, DATALOSSDB, http://www.datalossdb.org/incidents/1518-malicious-software-
hack-compromises-unknown-number-of-credit-cards-at-fifth-largest-credit-card-processor (source 
 requires registration to view). 
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financial account information, to an outside hacker.3 The aftereffects 
of this breach included a substantial federal lawsuit and settlement 
fund,4 substantial negative media coverage, and millions of 
customers (including the author) having to go through the process of 
waiting for a new card to arrive, checking statements for fraudulent 
transactions, and updating their information with vendors and 
automatic payment systems.5 All because a vendor of very substantial 
size failed to employ reasonable security measures that could have 
prevented the hacker. 
Cybersecurity is a complex topic in itself. Cybersecurity 
regulation, a topic of substantial policy and media attention over the 
past several years,6 involves a complex mixture of state and federal 
regulation including varying regulatory approaches and varying 
degrees of scope. This Article seeks to accomplish three tasks: 1) 
describe the existing framework of cybersecurity regulation and 
contextualize that framework within existing scholarship on 
regulation,7 2) present the results of a mixed-methods empirical study 
evaluating the efficacy of the various regulatory approaches currently 
in use,8 and 3) discuss how particular innovations in cybersecurity 
regulation result in a new, hybrid form of regulation not yet well-
described in the literature.9 
Unpacking “cybersecurity regulation” begins first with 
understanding to what the term “cybersecurity” refers. Cybersecurity 
and cyber-attack are increasingly common terms in public discourse, 
but there is surprising disagreement as to what precisely they refer. 
The terms are too-often used broadly to include all of electronic 
crimes,10 military action,11 domestic guard/homeland security 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Brian Krebs, Payment Processor Breach May Be Largest Ever, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2009, 1:30 
PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/01/payment_processor_breach_may_b.html? 
hpid=topnews. 
 4. See supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See generally infra notes 10–15. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 8. See discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II. 
 10. David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA Intent Requirement, 
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activities,12 corporate risk management,13 financial security,14 and a 
wide spectrum of other activities related to computers, the Internet, 
privacy, and other similar topics.15 I do not suggest the term is 
misapplied to any of these topics, but rather that more precise terms 
would be helpful. To that end, for the purposes of this Article, I 
discuss those aspects of cybersecurity which refer to the information 
security measures16 that custodians of consumer data17 take to protect 
such sensitive information. Thus the scope of this Article is private 
law and regulation, and uses the term information security to describe 
those administrative, technical, and physical methods and practices 
                                                                                                                 
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 909 (2013). 
 11. Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command in Review 
of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, 
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of Gen. Keith B. 
Alexander, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=733855. 
 12. Jennifer Martinez, Senators Introduce Bill to Create Teams of Cyber Guardsmen at State-Level, 
THE HILL (Mar. 22, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/289931-
senators-introduce-bill-to-create-teams-of-cyber-guards-at-state-level. 
 13. See, e.g., Defining the Future of Security and Risk, CSO40 SECURITY CONFAB + AWARDS 
http://www.csoconfab.com/ehome/index.php?eventid=48220&tabid=95096&categoryid=345082&disco
untcode=NLP& (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (describing generally the CSO40 conference of April 2–3, 
2013 on “Defining the Future of Security and Risk”). 
 14. Antone Gonsalves, Largest Banks Under Constant Cyberattack, Feds Say, CSO ONLINE (Nov. 2, 
2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article/720584/largest-banks-under-constant-cyberattack-feds-say. 
 15. See generally Digital Spotlight: Cybersecurity, CSO, Feb.–Mar. 2013, available at  
http://resources.idgenterprise.com/original/AST-0082567_FEB4digi_0214i.pdf. 
 16. As noted by Professor Andrea Matwyshyn, “[r]eferring to all of information security, 
particularly in private sector contexts, as ‘cybersecurity’ is technically incorrect.” Andrea M. 
Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 
817, n.99 (2013). Matwyshyn describes this misnomer as ignoring the aspects of physical security 
inherent in “holistic” protection of data maintained by an enterprise. Id. I concur with this assessment, 
and further suggest, as consistent with the Administrative/Technical/Physical breakdown described in 
Part II.B.3 of this Article, that such a characterization also overlooks the administrative aspects involved 
in protecting and securing information. See also Thaw, supra note 10, at 928 n.88 (discussing the 
distinction between purely-technical restrictions on computer usage and comprehensive administrative, 
technical, and physical restrictions thereon). 
 17. Generally, sensitive consumer data has been defined by federal and state statutes to include 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), sensitive financial information, Protected Health Information 
(PHI), and certain other information subject to specific privacy protections (e.g., educational records of 
students). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4) (2012) (defining “nonpublic personal [financial] information”); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.80(e) (West 2012) (defining “Personal information”); In re TJX Cos., No. C-
4227, 2008 WL 3150421, at *1 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2008) (defining “personal information” using language 
commonly found in similar FTC Consent Orders addressing privacy and information security issues); 45 
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (defining “protected health information”). 
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involved in maintaining the regulatory standards imposed on private 
data custodians. 
This Article introduces the concept of Management-Based 
Regulatory Delegation.18 Cybersecurity presents an uncommon 
challenge in that the regulated entities—the private sector data 
custodians described above—not only generally possess expertise 
useful to the rulemaking process, but in fact possess superior 
knowledge regarding information security threats and defenses not 
otherwise available to regulators. Federal regulators leverage this 
knowledge not only voluntarily, but in some cases by mandate, 
engaging private entities in the rulemaking and de facto standards-
setting processes.19 Scholars variously have referred to this as a form 
of regulatory delegation.20 In addition to including regulated entities 
at the proverbial “drafting table,”21 regulators also engage in a 
process of management-based regulation under which the regulated 
entities themselves develop and adhere to their own individualized 
compliance plans.22 While these plans must meet general guidelines, 
the regulatory goal becomes the development of and adherence to the 
plan, rather than compliance with specific technical obligations, 
directly.23 Scholars have referred to this process by several names;24 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is a mode of regulation under which administrative 
agencies, through legislative-mandated collaboration with regulatory stakeholders, promulgate 
regulations requiring regulated entities to develop plans designed to achieve certain aspirational goals 
laid out by the legislature. As discussed in Part II.B, Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is a 
combination of management-based regulation, in which administrative agencies promulgate 
requirements that regulated entities then develop, with regulatory delegation. Regulatory delegation is 
defined as a process in which administrative agencies enlist the expertise of the particular regulated 
party. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L. J. 377, 386 (2006). 
 19. As discussed in Part II.B.3, adjudication by the Federal Trade Commission through settlements 
of its enforcement actions creates effective cybersecurity standards that currently are viewed by 
practitioners as having a prospective regulatory effect. 
 20. E.g., Bamberger, supra note 18, at 385–86. 
 21. This is a level of engagement by regulated entities and other interested parties far in excess of 
anything required by informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act and possibly even 
exceeding that required under formal rulemaking guidelines. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). While such a 
discussion is outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting. 
 22. See generally infra notes 43, 84. 
 23. See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 386. 
 24. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
 
7
Thaw: The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation
Published by Reading Room, 2013
294 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
this Article addresses it as management-based regulation. The net 
result of combining these two forms of regulation is what I describe 
as Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, a deliberate encoding 
of regulatory capture—both in the rulemaking and enforcement 
stages of the administrative process—to engage the superior 
knowledge possessed by regulated entities. And, indeed, the Chief 
Information Security Officers (CISOs) interviewed as part of this 
study describe how they participated in these processes most 
particularly with respect to the HIPAA Security Rule.25 
I evaluate the efficacy of cybersecurity regulation by comparing 
the ability of those industries subject to Management-Based 
Regulatory Delegation models with those subject only to more 
directive regulatory models at preventing security breaches of 
sensitive consumer information. The latter category, which I describe 
as directive regulation, also presents an interesting finding in that the 
“directive” component results from an information disclosure-based 
regulation with a “safe harbor” provision that effectively becomes a 
directive mandate to employ the safe harbor. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I contextualizes 
cybersecurity regulation within the existing scholarship on regulatory 
frameworks and identifies how those frameworks fail to describe 
cybersecurity regulation adequately.26 Part II provides a descriptive 
account of a new hybrid form of regulation emerging in cybersecurity 
and proposes an alternate framework for categorizing regulation.27 
Using this framework, it divides existing cybersecurity regulation 
into two categories for comparative analysis. Part III presents the 
results of a quantitative study of security breach incidence which 
suggests that blending traditional directive regulation with 
                                                                                                                 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 692 n.1 (2003) (describing 
management-based regulation as a concept variously referred to as “‘enforced self-regulation’ 
(Braithwaite 1982), ‘mandated self-regulation’ (Bardach & Kagan 1982; Rees 1988), ‘reflexive’ 
regulation (Orts 1995), or ‘process-based’ (Gunningham & Grabosky 1998) and ‘systems-based’ 
(Gunningham 1996; Gunningham & Johnstone 1999) standards”). 
 25. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 26. See discussion infra Part I. 
 27. See discussion infra Part II. 
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Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is superior at breach 
prevention than is either method alone.28 Part IV provides a practical 
account of the effects of each type of regulation from the views of 
CISOs and suggests how blending the two modes of regulating can 
offset the various weaknesses inherent within each mode alone.29 
I.   DEVELOPING A THEORY OF REGULATORY CLASSIFICATION 
Information security laws have not yet been classified in the 
literature on regulation. Understanding these laws’ character and 
function is critical to evaluating their efficacy and considering both 
how to improve them and what lessons they may have for regulation 
in other industrial sectors. 
Information security regulation is unique at the federal level in that 
it heavily involves private parties both in the creation of standards 
and in the adherence to those standards through individualized 
compliance plans.30 This blend, which I describe as Management-
Based Regulatory Delegation, is a combination of theories advanced 
on regulatory delegation31 and management-based regulation.32 
A.   A Brief Summary of Information Security Regulations 
I discuss the various information security regulations considered in 
this Article in more depth later when developing a method of 
classifying those regulations for empirical comparison. Situating this 
work within the existing literature does, however, require some 
reference to these laws and regulations, and I provide here a brief 
overview of the main pieces of the information security regulatory 
puzzle. 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See discussion infra Part III. 
 29. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 30. See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 386. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24. 
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1.   Federal Information Security Regulation 
Information security regulation at the federal level comprises three 
primary components. The first, respecting the financial sector, is the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).33 GLBA provides both the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and various agencies within or 
associated with the Department of the Treasury authority to 
promulgate and enforce regulations regarding information security 
measures financial institutions must employ to protect the sensitive 
information they maintain on behalf of consumers.34 GLBA 
mandates a certain level of involvement by specific parties who must 
be consulted during the rulemaking process.35 
The second, respecting the healthcare sector, is the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),36 which 
provides the Department of Health and Human Services the authority 
to promulgate and enforce regulations regarding information security 
measures healthcare entities and their associates must employ to 
protect the sensitive information they maintain on behalf of patients, 
research subjects, and individuals whose medical information they 
collect/maintain.37 
Finally, the third component is the enforcement “jurisprudence” of 
the FTC under its “unfair and deceptive acts or practices” authority 
pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC Act.38 Under this authority, the FTC 
has engaged in a variety of enforcement actions asserting that various 
information security practices of entities subject to its jurisdiction 
were unfair, deceptive, or both, in that they failed to employ 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29 
U.S.C.). 
 34. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6804, 6805 (2012). 
 35. Id. § 6804(a)(2). 
 36. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(1) (2006). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
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reasonable information security measures to protect the sensitive 
personal information of those entities’ consumers.39 
2.   State Information Security Regulation 
At the state level, legislatures beginning in 2003 passed laws 
requiring entities losing control (experiencing security breaches) of 
certain “personal information” describing individuals to notify those 
individuals (and sometimes state regulatory authorities) of the 
breach, unless the data lost was encrypted.40 As of August 2012, 
forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands have such laws.41 This “encryption safe harbor,” 
under which an organization is exempt from disclosure if the data 
were encrypted, has the effect of transforming an information 
disclosure-based regulatory regime into a directive regulatory regime 
de facto requiring organizations to encrypt sensitive consumer data.42 
3.   Other Information Security Regulations 
It is worth noting to the reader that other information security 
regulations exist, both at the state and federal level, addressing 
protection of consumer information and the responsibilities of private 
entities. These include information security regulations promulgated 
by the Internal Revenue Service, by the Massachusetts Department of 
Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation, and laws passed by 
various states concerning maintenance and disposal of consumer 
information. Additionally, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have promulgated 
regulations and issued guidance concerning the information security 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2013). 
 41. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last updated Dec. 
26, 2013). 
 42. See infra Part IV. 
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of contractors with which the DoD does business and the disclosures 
publicly-traded companies should make to investors. 
The interviews with CISOs, my professional experience, and my 
impression of my current and former colleagues’ experiences in this 
regard all suggest that these “ancillary” regulations do not (yet) have 
a substantial impact on information security practices respecting 
consumer data. Thus at least at this stage of research, they are outside 
the scope of consideration. I include them here for the reader’s 
general information. 
B.   Coglianese and Lazer’s Model 
Cary Coglianese and David Lazer propose that regulatory models 
can be grouped into three discrete categories based on the stage in an 
organization’s production process at which the regulation attempts to 
intervene.43 They suggest that intervention may occur when planning 
production (“planning stage”), implementing production (“acting 
stage”), or determining the final outputs of production (“output 
stage”).44 Each of these stages, according to the Coglianese and Lazer 
model, corresponds to a different type of regulation. The sections that 
follow discuss these stages in detail. 
As defined by Coglianese and Lazer, technology-based regulation 
is an approach in which regulatory standards govern the means of 
production.45 Occurring at the implementation (or “acting”) stage, it 
specifies technologies that must be employed or processes that must 
be followed.46 Technology-based regulation in the pollution control 
context, for example, could specify certain types of emissions control 
technologies that must be employed. In the information security 
context, technology-based regulation could specify that custodians of 
sensitive personal information must employ specific security 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 693–94. 
 44. Id. at 694. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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measures such as anti-virus and anti-malware software on their 
systems. 
Performance-based regulation is an approach in which regulatory 
standards govern the final state or result of a production process.47 
Occurring at the output stage, regulation of this form specifies the 
characteristics of products or services that must be achieved or 
avoided. Unlike technology-based regulation, performance-based 
approaches are generally agnostic as to the means by which the 
producer achieves the specified goal. Performance-based regulation 
in the pollution control context, for example, could specify limits on 
the quantity of pollutants a manufacturing facility could release into 
the atmosphere. In the information security context, performance-
based regulation could specify that entities retaining payment card 
information must not lose control of (e.g., have stolen) consumers’ 
payment account information. 
Management-based regulation is an approach in which regulatory 
standards address conditions that must be met during the planning 
stage of a productive process—before manufacture of a product or 
provision of a service begins.48 It most commonly requires 
organizations to conduct risk assessments, produce risk management 
plans, or both.49 Unlike technology-based regulation or performance-
based regulation, management-based regulation does not begin from 
a premise of requiring an organization to engage in a pre-specified 
process or achieve a pre-specified goal. Rather, it mandates the 
undertaking of a general type of process (e.g., a risk assessment) and 
possibly adherence to the results of that process (e.g., a risk 
management plan). Management-based regulation may even specify 
general areas that these analyses and plans must address. The 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 694–95. 
 49. As noted by Coglianese and Lazer, management-based regulation may also require organizations 
to implement and adhere to the risk management plans they develop. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 
24, at 707–11. Such requirements structurally overlap both with technology-based regulation and with 
performance-based regulation in that they effectively specify approaches that must be employed and end 
conditions that must be achieved. The specifications of these technology and performance requirements 
will obviously differ as the organizations self-define the guidelines. 
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“compliance” element, however, is the actual development of the 
plan and the “compliance details” are specified by the organization 
(through its analyses/plans) rather than by the regulator. 
Management-based regulation in the pollution control context 
could, for example, require that manufacturing plants conduct 
analyses to determine their current levels of pollutants and develop 
plans to reduce those levels. In the information security context, 
management-based regulation could require that organizations 
maintaining sensitive personal information conduct risk analyses of 
their information systems and develop risk management plans to 
reduce the probability of those systems being compromised and 
individuals’ sensitive information being lost. 
Coglianese and Lazer’s model focuses heavily on the timing of 
regulatory intervention as the spectrum along which classes of 
regulation are differentiated.50 It strictly links the timing of regulatory 
intervention to the functional method of regulation. The resultant 
typology is incomplete for the purpose of classifying information 
security regulation. 
C.   The Role of “Timing” 
To understand the ways in which Coglianese and Lazer’s typology 
overlooks certain types (and potential types)51 of information security 
regulation, it is first necessary to understand what constitutes a 
security “good” or “output.” Coglianese and Lazer define outputs in 
the context of traditional industrial production.52 They consider 
outputs to “include both private and social goods, that is, saleable 
products or services (private goods) as well as the positive and 
negative externalities (social goods and bads) that affect society.”53 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See generally Coglianese & Lazier, supra note 24. 
 51. Discussing “potential types” of information security regulation is critical at this juncture both 
because the existing regulation only addresses the protection of certain types of information and because 
there are strong indications that federal regulators consider this to be a critical and urgent issue. 
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 52. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 693. 
 53. Id. 
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Unlike traditional industrial production involving the manufacture 
of physical products (e.g., foodstuffs) or the provision of professional 
services (e.g., management consulting services), information security 
does not have well-defined “outputs” of the type described above. In 
traditional industries, these well-defined outputs come into being at 
an end stage in the production lifecycle as a result of steps designed 
to result in the desired output.54 In the context of information 
security, the state of keeping an information system secure can be 
considered a good or service. A single security violation, however, 
does not mean the “good” has not been produced or the “service” not 
delivered. Information security, as identified by several respondents, 
is an exercise in risk mitigation, not risk prevention.55 Thus, many of 
the deliverable “goods” or “services” are defined by engaging in 
activities that are likely, but not guaranteed, to mitigate system 
compromise.56 It is therefore the act of engaging in those activities, 
not the result of the activities themselves, that constitutes the output 
for information security. Understanding this distinction between 
traditional goods and information security is critical to understanding 
how to evaluate information security regulation. 
A second critical difference is the means by which success or 
failure is evaluated. Coglianese and Lazer consider three industrial 
activities as examples in discussing their typology: food safety, 
pollution, and industrial safety.57 Information security does 
somewhat resemble these traditional areas in that each of them is 
associated with producing a physical good, rather than being the 
primary object of production themselves.58 Unlike these three 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See id. Figure 1 at 694. 
 55. Most of the CISOs interviewed described their job and the task of information security as risk 
management. One CISO, for example, even went so far as to describe their job as “[r]isk management, 
not security at all.” David Bernard Thaw, Characterizing, Classifying, and Understanding Information 
Security Laws and Regulations: Considerations for Policymakers and Organizations Protecting Sensitive 
Information Assets 8, n.16 (Spring 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file 
with Georgia State University Law Review). 
 56. Id. at 8. 
 57. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 696–700 (discussing authors’ typology). 
 58. Thaw, supra note 55, at 8 n.18 (“Information security is, in large part, a process/procedure/goal 
(to protect assets) associated with some other productive activity.”). 
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categories, however, information security lacks well-defined metrics 
by which to evaluate outcomes.59 The lack of well-defined metrics 
makes it difficult to evaluate information security outcomes strictly at 
the output stage. 
Professionals and regulators evaluate information security 
outcomes as a function of whether certain practices are followed, not 
whether those practices are effective. This approach is, in part, due to 
an inability to measure the efficacy of such practices because 
demonstrating success is often an exercise in “proving a negative.”60 
As a result, the characteristics used to evaluate “success” in 
information security reside not only at the output stage, but also at 
the acting and planning stages of Coglianese and Lazer’s typology. In 
the case of environmental pollution, for example, success ultimately 
can be evaluated by measuring a well-defined output condition—
what pollutants are (or are not) released. In the information security 
context, by contrast, the lack of a successful attack does not indicate 
that security measures were effective—exploitable system 
vulnerabilities simply may not have come under attack during the 
evaluation period. Thus the measure of success61 is not always 
directly linked to a goal or output in the traditional sense, and goals 
and outputs, therefore, must be considered more broadly with respect 
to information security. Specifically, as it pertains to this section, 
such breadth includes considering outputs to exist both at the 
planning and at the acting stages of Coglianese and Lazer’s typology. 
The refinements I propose address this disconnect by redefining the 
final stage of production to include outputs that occur 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 8 n.19 (“Several of the CISO respondents lamented the lack of available metrics 
particularly as it pertained to justifying information security expenditures to management.”). 
 60. Id. at 8 n.22 (“A few of the CISO respondents specifically expressed part of the difficulty in their 
job being the process of proving to management that resources allocated to information security were 
well-spent given the lack of something occurring—essentially placing them in the position of having to 
‘prove a negative.’”). 
 61. Id. at 9 n.23 (differentiating the measure of success “from the measure of compliance, which can 
be measured at all three stages in the industrial production cycle—a fact obviously central to Coglianese 
and Lazer’s analysis”). 
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chronologically at other stages, but are information security 
outcomes as defined in this section. 
I discuss this concept, which I call the Information Security 
Production Lifecycle, in the section that follows. Understanding the 
role of timing is critical to understanding the shortcomings of 
Coglianese and Lazer’s typology for categorizing information 
security regulation. Understanding timing in this context requires 
understanding how the Information Security Production Lifecycle 
differs from the production lifecycle for more traditional goods. The 
section that follows identifies these differences, thereby setting up the 
background to discuss the specific shortcomings of Coglianese and 
Lazer’s typology. 
1.   The Information Security Production Lifecycle (ISPL)62 
Information security has the interesting characteristic of being both 
an economic good and a process of producing that good. It is a good 
in the sense of providing definable (and sometimes measurable) 
outcomes. The process of producing these outcomes, however, is also 
an element of information security. In other examples, such as 
manufactured products, the process to produce the product is distinct 
from the product itself and may employ technologies unrelated to the 
final product. Information security differs in that elements of the 
productive process to achieve information security outcomes are also 
elements of the outcomes themselves. 
Put differently, the means of reaching an information security 
outcome are as much an information security “product” as is the 
outcome itself. For example, an information security outcome may be 
to reduce the incidence of computers being hijacked for use in a 
“botnet,”63 and a means for achieving that outcome may be the 
deployment of system security software including anti-virus software 
with heuristic detection. The deployment of such software is also a 
                                                                                                                 
 62. The text accompanying this part is largely attributable to Thaw, supra note 55, at 7–12. 
 63. Botnet Definition, TECH TERMS COMPUTER DICTIONARY, http://www.techterms.com/definition/ 
botnet (last updated June 9, 2010). 
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recognized information security goal, or “product,” independent of 
the organization’s specific focus on countering a particular or general 
threat of machine hijack.64 
In the following three sections, I propose a friendly refinement to 
the stages of production examined by Coglianese and Lazer. The 
purpose of this refinement (and renaming) is specific to information 
security and to industries that may resemble its production 
characteristics.65 
a.   Design/Planning Stage 
The design and planning stage is that point in the ISPL when 
decisions about how to implement information security measures are 
made. Coglianese and Lazer refer to this as the “planning” stage in 
organizational production and that stage at which management-based 
regulation is targeted.66 Many of the characteristics they associate 
with management-based regulation are applicable to the design and 
planning stage defined here. As applied to information security, 
however, their model does not anticipate planning activities that 
require specific implementation choices, whereas the effects of some 
information security regulations do require that such decisions be 
made at the planning stage.67 This differs from Coglianese and 
Lazer’s conception of management-based regulation, which they 
describe as “shar[ing] some of the advantages of performance-based 
regulation in that it allows firms the flexibility to choose their own 
control or prevention strategies.”68 
                                                                                                                 
 64. INT’L INFO. SYS. SEC. CERTIFICATION CONSORTIUM, CERTIFIED INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
SECURITY PROFESSIONAL CANDIDATE INFORMATION BULLETIN 18 (2012) (noting that preventing or 
responding to “attacks (e.g., malicious code, zero-day exploit, denial of service)” and “[i]mplement[ing] 
and support[ing] patch and vulnerability management” are critical to security operations). 
 65. The following should not be interpreted to suggest that the stages of production examined by 
Coglianese and Lazer should be refined in the context of traditional industries; in fact, as of the time of 
this writing I have not yet identified any other industries bearing the characteristics of information 
security that suggest these refinements. 
 66. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 693–94. 
 67. See, e.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2013). 
 68. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 702; Thaw, supra note 55, at 10 n.28 (“[M]anagement-
based regulation mandates that firms engage in planning activities but does not specify how those 
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b.   Implementation/Maintenance Stage 
The implementation and maintenance stage is that portion of the 
ISPL encompassing activities giving effect to security measures, 
responding to security incidents/events, and other activities related to 
the deployment and upkeep of security plans. This includes the 
implementation and maintenance not only of technical security 
measures, but also of administrative and physical security measures 
as well. Coglianese and Lazer refer to this as the acting stage.69 In 
their typology, it is that stage at which technology-based regulation is 
targeted.70 
c.   Efficacy/Output Stage 
The Efficacy/Output Stage is that portion of the ISPL 
encompassing definable outcomes. I suggest that such definable 
outcomes are used to evaluate success at, and exist at, all three stages 
of the ISPL. These outcomes include both: (1) procedural outcomes 
or those as steps taken to mitigate risk; and (2) measurable outcomes 
or those for which an external metric can evaluate success.71 
Together, these two categories define the Efficacy/Output Stage. 
This is markedly different from Coglianese and Lazer’s approach, 
which considers the output stage (as they call it) to be that stage of 
production in which outputs (both good and bad) come into being.72 
Outputs in traditional industries come into being at the end of a 
production cycle as the result of some process or steps designed to 
                                                                                                                 
activities must implement mechanisms to achieve regulatory goals.”) (emphasis in original). 
 69. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 694. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Thaw, supra note 55, at 11 n.30 (“‘External metric’ in this context refers to something not an 
element of the information security process, such as a data breach, electronic break-in, network 
compromise, or other failure of security. It can also represent positive outcomes, such as the successful 
detection of and defense against an attack, or the investigation of an incident and apprehension of the 
perpetrator of that incident. This distinction is important as it highlights the difference between 
traditional outcomes (appropriate to be measured and examined at the output/efficacy stage) and 
information security outcomes which, as discussed above . . . exist at all stages of the ISPL.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
 72. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 693–94. 
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result in those outputs. In the context of information security, I argue 
that many outputs are the actual process or steps themselves, and 
come into being chronologically before the “end” stage of 
production. 
The deployment of system security software, for example, is a 
recognized procedural outcome that occurs chronologically at the 
Design/Planning (as to software selection) and Implementation/ 
Maintenance (as to operation/updating) Stages. For the purposes of 
characterizing certain regulation, however, it makes sense to consider 
this goal as an outcome rather than as a process to achieve an 
outcome. The choice of approach will depend on the structure of, and 
purpose behind, the regulation. A regulation that seeks to implement 
system security software to achieve some other specific goal, such as 
the protection of personal information, suggests treating the 
deployment of system security software as a process, not an outcome. 
A regulation that seeks to implement system security software to 
mitigate negative externalities caused by the absence of that software, 
however, suggests treating the deployment of such software as an 
outcome. This distinction, while perhaps overly fine, is important in 
characterizing the function of information security regulation and is 
thus a necessary refinement to Coglianese and Lazer’s approach. 
Measurable outcomes are the result of processes or steps. The most 
straightforward example is security incidents. While these are 
negative outcomes, they are definable, measurable events. These 
types of occurrences are always outcomes and more closely align 
with the traditional concept of production outputs. Measurable 
outcomes and procedural outcomes together define the 
Efficacy/Output Stage for the purposes of characterizing information 
security regulation. 
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D.   Coglianese and Lazer’s Model is Incomplete 
First, technology-based regulation is under-inclusive. By linking 
strictly to regulation of methods and means at the production stage,73 
Coglianese and Lazer’s conception of technology-based regulation 
ignores regulatory instruments that address methods and means, but 
do so at a different stage of the production cycle. Consider a case 
where the technology is itself the output of the productive process. If 
the “good” in question is an authentication mechanism to allow 
accountholders electronic access to their financial accounts, 
regulatory intervention governing the final output product would 
regulate “technology” as much as would regulations aimed at the 
process of developing the authentication mechanism. To be sure, the 
latter is a necessary part of information security regulation, and as 
identified by the International Information Systems Security 
Certification Consortium ((ISC)2), security considerations must be a 
part of the software development life cycle.74 However, to limit the 
term “technology-based regulation” only to those events occurring 
during production fails to capture fully the ways in which technology 
may be regulated. 
Second, performance-based regulation fails to consider 
circumstances where the target of the regulation is output conditions, 
but aspects of the regulation’s mechanism produce an effect 
regulating technology or means during the production stage. Perhaps 
the most notable examples of this phenomenon are the Security 
Breach Notification (SBN) statutes, which led to the rapid adoption 
of technologies to encrypt sensitive personal information stored on 
removable or portable media.75 This adoption appears largely to 
result, as discussed in Part III, from provisions in most jurisdictions’ 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 693–95. 
 74. INT’L INFO. SYS. SEC. CERTIFICATION CONSORTIUM, supra note 64, at 12 (noting that “[s]ecurity 
of the software environment”—including “[o]peration and maintenance” and “[c]hange management”—
are essential components of “security in the software development life cycle”). 
 75. Thaw, supra note 55, at 13, 105–06. 
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SBN statutes providing “safe harbors” from notification requirements 
if the compromised or lost data was encrypted.76 
Third, Coglianese and Lazer’s typology ties management-based 
regulation to the planning stage of production. Unlike with 
technology-based or production-based regulation, Coglianese and 
Lazer’s typology does consider some regulatory activity outside the 
planning stage. Specifically, they consider that management-based 
regulation may mandate both planning activities and implementation 
of the activities specified by the plan.77 This distinction is important, 
and allows their typology to consider forms of regulation like 
HIPAA, which mandate both that Covered Entities develop security 
plans and that they adhere to those plans.78 
Enforcement such as that by the FTC however, as discussed in 
greater detail in Part II, presents a hybrid model of management-
based regulation not captured by Coglianese and Lazer’s typology. 
FTC enforcement actions result both in specific compliance orders 
and in a requirement to conduct regular information security (and/or 
privacy) assessments.79 Unlike the assessments conceived under 
traditional management-based regulation, FTC-ordered assessments 
are reactive in nature instead of proactive.80 Furthermore, the 
effective goals of those assessments are tied ex ante (the assessment) 
to those specific compliance objectives.81 
The effective result is a hybrid style of management-based 
regulation involving assessments which begin from a different 
chronological point than described by Coglianese and Lazer’s 
traditional model. Additionally, these consent decrees have a broader 
effect, as the specific compliance elements thereof often are 
considered to become de facto regulations to which other firms are 
subject, as discussed further below in Part II.82 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 706. 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(1) (2006). 
 79. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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E.   Reconsidering Regulatory Classification for Information Security 
Certain information security regulatory structures rely on a 
fundamental concept of “reasonable security.”83 This concept, not 
unlike other forms of regulation, presumes that a one-size-fits-all 
approach to regulating is not optimal84 and looks to the regulated 
industrial sectors (and their constituent entities) to exercise some 
professional judgment as to what choices are reasonable to meet the 
compliance requirements of the regulations. HIPAA and GLBA are 
the two most prevalent examples of this type of regulation in the 
information security space. 
The concept described above bears general resemblance to 
Coglianese and Lazer’s conception of management-based regulation. 
However, as discussed above, their definition fails to adequately 
capture the character of these laws for the purposes of understanding 
information security regulation. Part II discusses an alternate 
approach to understanding HIPAA and GLBA (respectively). This 
groundwork explains what HIPAA and GLBA are—regulatory 
frameworks that seek input from industry professionals in the 
establishment of their regulations. To fully understand the effects of 
this style of regulation on the organization, it is necessary to 
distinguish these frameworks from other regulatory frameworks with 
an apparently similar notice-and-comment rulemaking process. 
I propose considering regulation in three categories: (1) traditional 
legislation that is merely directive, and does not provide rulemaking 
authority to administrative agencies;85 (2) legislation that delegates 
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies but does not specify 
deference to industry;86 and (3) legislation that delegates rulemaking 
authority to administrative agencies and specifies that those agencies 
must consult with industry stakeholders during the rulemaking 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
§ 1173(d), 100 Stat. 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2006)). 
 84. See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 387 (“One-size-fits-all rules cannot easily account for the ways 
in which risk manifests itself differently across firms.”). 
 85. See discussion infra Part I.E.1. 
 86. See discussion infra Part I.E.2. 
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process and in some cases must defer to industry standards.87 The 
first category describes regulation, as discussed in Part IV, that 
interferes with the exercise of professional discretion by information 
security professionals. The third category describes regulation that 
encourages reliance on the discretion of information security 
professionals. 
1.   Directive Legislation 
Directive legislation is that which does not involve a rulemaking 
process by an administrative or other agency. The legislation itself 
establishes (usually straightforward) standards governing regulated 
entities and leaves no details to administrative agencies. Two 
examples of such legislation are the Video Privacy Protection Act 
(VPPA)88 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).89 
The VPPA specifies limitations on the disclosure of personally 
identifiable information90 of consumers who rent, purchase, or 
subscribe to other goods and services from a video tape service 
provider.91 The restriction is straightforward, and the statute neither 
prescribes any rulemaking authority nor references the involvement 
of an administrative agency in the regulatory process. 
ECPA operates in a similar fashion. It makes the unlawful 
interception92 of wire communications a felony93 and specifies 
precisely what constitutes unlawful interception and what exceptions 
exist.94 Like the VPPA, ECPA neither prescribes rulemaking 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See discussion infra Part I.E.3. 
 88. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–11 (Supp. 2013)). 
 89. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–11 (2012)). 
 90. Interestingly, the VPPA provides one of the earlier definitions of “personally identifiable 
information”—one that far predated those codified in SBNs. The VPPA’s definition is simple but 
ambiguous, “includ[ing] information which identifies a person as having . . . obtained specific video 
materials or services from a video tape service provider[.]” Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 
§ 2.a.2(3). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 92. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012). 
 93. Id. § 2511(4)(a). 
 94. Id. § 2511(2). 
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authority for any administrative agency—even the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC)—nor references the 
involvement of any such agency, except as to referencing previously 
existing FCC rules for descriptive purposes.95 
SBNs, which I discuss extensively in Part II, also bear this 
character. They share a common framework of describing a 
triggering condition, which if met requires notification of a loss of 
control of certain types of personal information, unless certain 
exceptions (e.g., the data was encrypted) apply.96 With the exception 
of deferment to law enforcement agencies as to delaying notification 
obligations, these statutes generally do not involve administrative 
agencies at all. When they do, it is generally limited to a centralized 
reporting requirement and not a rulemaking component. This type of 
regulation has substantial implications for information security 
professionalism in organizations as discussed in detail in Part IV. 
2.   Traditional Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
The traditional “notice-and-comment” rulemaking process is one 
with which regulatory practitioners would likely be familiar. 
Congress crafts legislation specifying general goals, and directs an 
administrative agency to engage in a “rulemaking” process to fill in 
the details.97 The agency publishes notices to this effect in the 
Federal Register, inviting the public (and more specifically, 
interested parties) to submit comments.98 The agency then considers 
these comments and drafts regulations pursuant to the authority 
granted to it by Congress.99 It publishes those regulations and their 
effective date in the Code of Federal Regulations, and after the 
effective date, entities subject to the regulations are responsible for 
compliance therewith.100 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See generally § 2511. 
 96. Thaw, supra note 55, at 34. 
 97. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 98. Id. § 553(b). 
 99. Id. § 553(c). 
 100. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
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Many regulations across a wide variety of substantive fields follow 
this model. In the consumer/privacy regulatory space, two notable 
examples are the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA)101 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).102 COPPA, 
for example, specifies that the FTC shall implement regulations to 
ensure various protections with respect to children’s usage of 
websites.103 
These regulations require the FTC to, subject to the requirements 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),104 promulgate 
regulations to achieve the intent specified above. The APA does not 
specifically require the FTC (or any other federal agency) to defer to 
the judgment of private industry or professionals in the promulgation 
of those rules. FCRA has similar requirements.105 
Delegating these responsibilities to the FTC (and other financial 
regulatory agencies) makes sense. Developing rules for consumer 
notification procedures is a core competency of the Commission.106 
Likewise, developing rules governing the use of consumer reports 
and related financial information is a core competency of the 
Commission and the other financial regulatory agencies referenced in 
FCRA.107 
On the surface, HIPAA and GLBA appear to fit this model. There 
is, however, a fine but critical difference between the way in which 
this process was implemented with respect to HIPAA and GLBA as 
                                                                                                                 
1673, 1683–88, 1775 n.500 (providing a thorough discussion of the administrative agency rulemaking 
process, with specific relevant emphasis at the pages noted, and a critique of this process). 
 101. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2006)). 
 102. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-507, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1681–81u (2006)). 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b). 
 104. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 500–04 (2006)). 
 105. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(q)(3), 1681b(g)(5), 1681c(h)(2), 1681i(e)(4), 1681j(a)(1)(C)(i) 
(providing various federal regulatory agencies’ rulemaking authority and prescribing mandatory 
rulemaking processes that those agencies must engage in to fill in gaps not addressed specifically by 
statute). 
 106. Thaw, supra note 55, at 26. 
 107. Id. 
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compared to other traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking. The 
difference lies in Congress’s command to the regulatory agencies 
with respect to the rulemaking process and the differences in the core 
competencies of the relevant agencies at the time HIPAA and GLBA 
were passed.108 
3.   Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking with Deference to Industry 
(Regulatory Delegation) 
There is a fine but critical distinction between traditional notice-
and-comment rulemaking under the APA and the rulemaking 
requirements Congress established for HIPAA and GLBA. In each of 
these cases, Congress specifically called out groups with whom the 
administrative agencies promulgating the rules must consult.109 
Those groups comprised representatives of industry and other key 
stakeholders who, notably, did have privacy and information security 
competencies that the respective HIPAA and GLBA agencies were 
unlikely to have (at that time). Additionally, these stakeholders had 
access to unique information about information security threats and 
the efficacy of various defenses at addressing those threats likely 
unique to the stakeholders and not otherwise readily available to the 
regulators. In the case of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, for example, 
Congress specifically required that: “(d) Consultation.—In carrying 
out this section, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 
consult with—(1) the National Committee on Vital and Health 
Statistics established under section 306(k) of the Public Health 
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242k(k)); and (2) the Attorney General.”110 In 
                                                                                                                 
 108. In the case of HIPAA, the Department of Health and Human Services; in the case of GLBA, the 
federal financial regulatory agencies charged with its implementation. See infra note 204. 
 109. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264(d), 110 
Stat. 2033, 2034 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2006)); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.). 
 110. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 264(d) (applying this consultation 
requirement to the regulatory authority afforded HHS in § 264). 
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the case of the HIPAA Security Rule,111 Congress’s command was 
even more explicit: 
In complying with the requirements of this part [which includes 
§ 1173(d)], the Secretary shall rely on the recommendations of 
the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics 
established under section 242k(k) of this title [the Public Health 
Service Act], and shall consult with appropriate Federal and 
State agencies and private organizations. The Secretary shall 
publish in the Federal Register any recommendation of the 
National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics regarding the 
adoption of a standard under this part.112 
The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) 
comprises key stakeholders in the health and health information 
policy fields from industry, government, and academia.113 The 
current committee comprises 
18 individuals distinguished in the fields of health statistics, 
electronic interchange of health care information, privacy and 
security of electronic information, population-based public 
health, purchasing or financing health care services, integrated 
computerized health information systems, health services 
research, consumer interests in health information, health data 
standards,  epidemiology, and the provision of health services.114 
                                                                                                                 
 111. § 1173(d), 110 Stat. at 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2006)) 
(authorizing regulations set forth at 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164). See infra notes 189–193. 
 112. § 1172(f), 110 Stat. at 2024 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(f) (2006)) (emphasis 
added) (§ 1172(f) applies to HIPAA § 1173(d) per the specifications of HIPAA § 1172(c)(3)(A)(ii) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006))). 
 113. Nat’l Comm. on Vital & Health Statistics, Introduction to the NCVHS, NVCHS, 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/intro.htm (last updated Mar. 13, 2006). See also 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k)(2) 
(2012). 
 114. Nat’l Comm. on Vital & Health Statistics, supra note 113. The full committee membership is 
available online at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/members.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 2014). 
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As noted above, the Committee is also responsible for assisting the 
Secretary in promulgating rules relating to the HIPAA “Security 
Rule,”115 which governs the information security requirements for the 
interchange of health-related information.116 
In the case of GLBA, Congress’s command is not as clear. The Act 
requires that: 
(b) . . . each [of the 8 GLBA regulators] shall establish 
appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to their 
jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards— 
(1) to ensure the security and confidentiality of customer records 
and information; 
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the 
security or integrity of such records; and 
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such 
records or information which could result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience to any customer.117 
It specifies that, with respect to rulemaking in this regard: 
(1) Rulemaking 
 
The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union 
Administration, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Securities and 
                                                                                                                 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d). 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k)(5)(A)(iv)-(v), (vii) (requiring the Committee to “advise the Secretary” “with 
respect to the design of and approval of health statistical and health information systems concerned with 
the collection, processing, and tabulation of health statistics within the Department of Health and 
Human Services, with respect to the Cooperative Health Statistics System established under subsection 
(e) of this section, and with respect to the standardized means for the collection of health information 
and statistics to be established by the Secretary under subsection (j)(1) of this section;” “to review and 
comment on findings and proposals developed by other organizations and agencies and to make 
recommendations for their adoption or implementation by local, State, national, or international 
agencies;” and “to issue an annual report on the state of the Nation’s health, its health services, their 
costs and distributions, and to make proposals for improvement of the Nation’s health statistics and 
health information systems”). 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). 
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Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission shall 
each prescribe, after consultation as appropriate with 
representatives of State insurance authorities designated by the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, such 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
subchapter with respect to the financial institutions subject to 
their jurisdiction under section 6805 of this title. 
 
(2) Coordination, consistency, and comparability 
 
Each of the agencies and authorities required under paragraph 
(1) to prescribe regulations shall consult and coordinate with the 
other such agencies and authorities for the purposes of assuring, 
to the extent possible, that the regulations prescribed by each 
such agency and authority are consistent and comparable with 
the regulations prescribed by the other such agencies and 
authorities.118 
While this text does not explicitly require the involvement of 
private industry groups, in practice the financial institutions regulated 
by each of the above entities and the state insurance authorities work 
closely with these regulators, particularly with respect to the 
promulgation of new regulations.119 Furthermore, as alluded to 
above, the core competency of these agencies (especially at the time 
of GLBA’s enactment) was not information security. Financial 
institutions, by contrast, had substantial incentive to invest in 
information security, a fact revealed by the CISO interviews120 and 
supported by the quantitative analysis below.121 As such, it seems 
reasonable to expect that, although not explicitly mandated by 
Congress, these agencies would actively seek the involvement of 
industry stakeholders in a manner more similar to that required for 
                                                                                                                 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(1–2) (1999) (updated with some differences in language in 2011). 
 119. Thaw, supra note 55, at 29. 
 120. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 121. See discussion infra Part III. 
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HIPAA than that conducted with ordinary notice-and-comment 
procedures under the APA. 
In essence, we see in this final category a form of informal 
rulemaking employing “Notice-and-Comment-Plus-Plus,” where not 
only do the organic statutes require the administrative agencies to 
engage more than the baseline requirements of § 553 of the APA, but 
those statutes specifically encode regulatory capture of industry 
stakeholders into the rulemaking process itself. 
II.   APPLYING THE MODEL TO INFORMATION SECURITY 
The primary goal of this work is to develop a better understanding 
of how information security regulations function and suggest ways to 
improve security outcomes through regulation. The empirical 
approaches discussed in Parts III and IV require that existing laws 
and regulations be sufficiently grouped for the purposes of 
comparison. Based on the theoretical framework developed in Part 
I,122 this Part proposes grouping the most predominant existing 
information security laws and regulations into two groups for the 
purposes of analysis: (1) Directive Regulation;123 and (2) 
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation.124 
A.   Directive Regulation 
Directive Regulation comprises laws and/or regulations laying out 
express performance standards and/or means of achieving 
performance. This category of regulation is directive in nature, 
                                                                                                                 
 122. This Part discusses, but does not rely upon, the timing component of each regulation in 
developing the two regulatory groupings for empirical comparison. The nature of timing is such that 
coupling it to the form of regulation may fail to consider more precise distinctions among information 
security regulations. As of the time of this writing, while such precise distinctions do exist, there are an 
insufficient number of regulatory models in place to allow empirically valid comparison among all 
different models. If the trend of increasing regulation of information security practices continues, future 
data may be sufficient to create more fine-grained comparisons among regulatory categories. In another 
work, I propose a comprehensive model for such fine-grained categorization. See Thaw, supra note 55. 
 123. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 124. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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traditionally is handled by legislatures (perhaps with limited, precise 
delegation to administrative agencies),125 and generally involves the 
specification either of means of performance or means of 
achievement. In the context of information security, the various state 
Security Breach Notification (SBN) laws are the predominant 
example of this form of regulation. 
SBN statutes are laws requiring an entity that loses control of 
“personal information” it maintains about individuals to disclose that 
loss to those individuals.126 As of May 2013, forty-six states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
had such laws.127 The original intent of these laws was to help 
consumers protect themselves against identity theft by requiring data 
custodians to notify individuals when a custodian lost control of 
information that could facilitate identity theft.128 SBNs generally 
specify what constitutes covered information, what are triggering 
events, who must be notified of breaches, and under what exceptions 
notification is unnecessary or may be delayed.129 Each jurisdiction’s 
SBN provides an exception to reporting requirements under which—
if the data was encrypted—the entity need not report the event.130 
To date, no state’s SBN statute involves a rulemaking process by 
an administrative agency.131 Rather, the text of the statute fully 
specifies all aspects of the notification requirements and 
exemptions.132 In this regard, SBNs are directive legislation. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. To the extent agencies promulgate regulations strictly to enforce specific legislative mandates 
and without substantial exercise of agency discretion, such regulations may also fall into this category. 
As of the time of writing, the author is unaware of any such examples of this model in the information 
security regulatory context. 
 126. State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., CAL. ASSEMB., CAL. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1386, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (2002) (Senate 
Third Reading and analysis of Saskia Kim). 
 129. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-910 to -912 (West 2007). For a list of all states with Security Breach 
Notification laws, see State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41. 
 130. § 912. 
 131. The Massachusetts Data Security Standards do involve an administrative agency, but not as 
respects the details of the breach notification requirement. These aspects are fully captured in the text of 
the law passed by the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
93H, § 2 (2013). 
 132. Massachusetts’s statute does define the meaning of “encrypted” in its statutory text. MASS. GEN. 
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On their face, SBNs appear to be traditional performance-based 
regulations targeting the Output/Efficacy Stage of the ISPL. The 
aspect of SBNs relating to the condition they seek to prevent is best 
characterized as performance-based regulation. It specifies a 
condition—the loss of control of personal information—which is 
undesirable and should be avoided. That condition is an outcome—
whether or not the “security” of a system has been breached133—and 
is clearly measured at the Output/Efficacy Stage of the ISPL. 
Consider, for example, the following language from New York 
State’s SBN: 
Any person or business which conducts business in New York 
state, and which owns or licenses computerized data which 
includes private information134 shall disclose any breach of the 
security of the system following discovery or notification of the 
breach in the security of the system to any resident of New York 
state whose private information was, or is reasonably believed to 
have been, acquired by a person without valid authorization. The 
disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and 
without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs 
of law enforcement, as provided in subdivision four of this 
section, or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the 
                                                                                                                 
LAWS ch. 93H, § 1(a). It is worth noting that Massachusetts’s statute, unlike most other states’ SBNs, 
does permit the Department of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulations to adopt regulations to 
revise the definition of “encrypted.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1(b). However, it neither requires the 
Department do so, nor does it appear that if the Department were to do so, that it would have anything 
more than a marginal impact on the applicability of the statute. 
 133. “Breach” in this context refers to any compromise of administrative, technical, or physical 
procedures resulting in the acquisition of information by an unauthorized party. 
 134. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(b) (McKinney 2013) (“‘Private information’ shall mean 
personal information consisting of any information in combination with any one or more of the 
following data elements, when either the personal information or the data element is not encrypted, or 
encrypted with an encryption key that has also been acquired: (1) social security number; (2) driver’s 
license number or non-driver identification card number; or (3) account number, credit or debit card 
number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit 
access to an individual’s financial account.”). For the definition of “personal information,” see § 899-
aa(1)(a) (“‘Personal information’ shall mean any information concerning a natural person which, 
because of name, number, personal mark, or other identifier, can be used to identify such natural 
person.”). 
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breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the system.135 
This statute essentially requires disclosure when any of an 
individual’s social security number, driver’s license/non-driver 
identification number, or financial account number in connection 
with information that identifies that individual (e.g., their name) is 
acquired by an unauthorized person as the result of a data breach.136 
The focus here is on the “breach in the security of the system” 
language that is used several times throughout the statute. This 
language is the “triggering event” that results in the “penalty” aspect 
of the regulation—requirements to notify individuals.137 Thus this 
aspect of New York State’s SBN is best described as an “output” or 
as relating to the effectiveness of the system, and thus is best 
considered as part of the Output/Efficacy stage. Because the text of 
the statute explicitly identifies this condition, it is best described as 
targeting that condition, rather than generating an effect. The other 
U.S. jurisdictions that have such laws use statutory language 
producing an effect similar to that defined above.138 SBNs, therefore, 
have the characteristic of being performance-based regulation 
targeting the Output/Efficacy Stage of the production lifecycle. 
It is also important to note that a primary impetus behind the 
passing of California Senate Bill 1386, which later became what is 
now California’s SBN, was the desire to improve the ability of 
“[California] consumers [to] protect their financial security.”139 
Specifically, the legislature sought to accomplish this by establishing 
                                                                                                                 
 135. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2). 
 136. Id. § 899-aa. 
 137. New York State also has a centralized notification requirement (§ 899-aa(8)(a)) which requires 
notification of three state agencies in the event of any breach affecting New York State residents and a 
consumer reporting agency notification requirement (§ 899-aa(8)(b)) which requires notification of the 
three major consumer reporting agencies in the event of a breach affecting more than 5,000 New York 
State residents. Id. § 899-aa(8)(a)-(b). 
 138. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.81.5–1798.82 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36(a)-701 
(2006). See also State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41 (providing a current listing of 
and citations to all U.S. jurisdictions with SBNs). 
 139. CAL. ASSEMB., CAL. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1386, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (2002) (Senate Third 
Reading and analysis of Saskia Kim). 
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law requiring organizations to make consumers aware of when their 
data was compromised.140 This impetus does not affect the present 
analysis of the law’s character, as it simply defines the social goal 
that the performance-based means were chosen to advance.141 The 
impetus is, however, important to note, and it raises the question of 
whether the law is actually effective at achieving this goal. 
Interviews with CISOs revealed the surprising result that SBNs 
had a predominant effect of driving the implementation of technical 
practices.142 Specifically, organizations began to institute unilateral 
laptop/portable media encryption policies.143 According to several 
respondents, this effort was not a response to any particular evidence 
that doing so would decrease the number of individuals whose 
identity was stolen as a result of data breaches,144 but rather in 
response to the spread of SBNs throughout U.S. jurisdictions and the 
high-profile security incidents disclosed pursuant to those laws. 
Consider, for example, the following excerpts from one interview 
with the CISO of a large healthcare organization: 
And so what’s been really interesting about the notification laws 
is [they] have come in and they have essentially reversed the 
whole direction security was taking . . . the security investment is 
moved essentially to crypto. Just encrypt as much as you can. 
Whatever it takes, just encrypt it. If it moves, encrypt it. If it 
stays there, encrypt it.145 
According to this respondent, SBNs have directly resulted in the 
respondent’s organization implementing encryption policies for all of 
their portable computing devices and media.146 These policies clearly 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See discussion infra Part IV; Thaw, supra note 55, at 22. 
 143. Thaw, supra note 55, at 22 n.66. 
 144. This is not to say that doing so would not have an effect in reducing identity theft, nor is it to say 
that encrypting portable media is an ineffective security practice. 
 145. Thaw, supra note 55, at 37. 
 146. Id. 
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result in the adoption of a specific technology (encryption), a classic 
example of the means-based regulation parameter. The respondent 
also specifically describes how existing data and devices will be 
encrypted: “Just encrypt as much as you can. Whatever it takes, just 
encrypt it.”147 This language implies that the “reversal” in 
organizational direction resulted in post-facto changes to the existing 
system, thus producing an effect at the Implementation/Maintenance 
Stage. While one might imagine a policy change involving 
encryption to affect the Design/Planning Stage,148 the language in 
this instance makes clear that effect occurs at the 
Implementation/Maintenance Stage in this respondent’s 
organization.149 Finally, although perhaps obvious, it is worth noting 
that the respondent’s language describes an effect resulting from the 
introduction of SBNs, not the specific intent of the SBNs 
themselves.150 The intended “targets” of SBNs were the reduction of 
data breach incidents and ensuring that individuals were made aware 
when their identity had been placed at risk of “theft” or other use in 
fraudulent activity.151 
Another respondent identified this same effect of SBNs driving 
encryption, although interestingly did so in a more positive 
context.152 The respondent described how it simplified their 
organization’s process of complying with the law, and provided their 
organization flexibility in selecting specific technologies to meet the 
encryption “goal”: 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. 
 148. For example, a policy that an organization’s security professionals must design a system capable 
of scanning all future (and possibly existing) data for qualifying “sensitive information” and, when such 
information is found, that information must automatically (via some technical mechanism) become 
subject to encryption requirements. An approach of this form would more substantially affect the 
Design/Planning stage than that policy discussed by this respondent. 
 149. In this sense, the encryption mandate was both a directive to do things a certain way in the future 
(Design/Planning stage) and a directive to layer encryption onto existing systems 
(Implementation/Maintenance stage). 
 150. Thaw, supra note 55, at 37–38. 
 151. Id. at 38. 
 152. Id. 
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. . . despite my reservations about SB-1396, on which most of the 
breach notification legislation has been modeled, it was 
exemplary in one regard . . . it was an extremely small piece of 
legislation . . . [that] has the whole encryption safe harbor 
concept built into it which [], in practice, has turned out to be 
very prescient. . . . [D]espite my issues with it, there is a 
difference between [a] breach and a loss of custody, and [the 
encryption safe harbor] is a very good example of how to 
manage [compliance to avoid reporting].153 
The respondent here clearly does not think that ordinary loss of 
custody, such as a laptop being stolen in a public café, should give 
rise to a reportable incident. Yet the respondent indicates, 
nonetheless, that the encryption safe harbor has simplified their 
responsibilities by providing a single method for “compliance” with 
SBNs (avoidance of the reporting requirement)—encrypting all 
portable computing devices and media.154 The respondent further 
notes that they find this style of approach preferable “‘[b]ecause it 
does not legislate technology,’” referring to the fact that their 
organization is able to select which encryption technologies are used 
to achieve the goal.155 
While both respondents identify a condition supporting the 
proposition that SBNs have an effect of driving the use of encryption 
technology, it is interesting to note the divergent views they took as 
to the appropriateness of that approach. These divergent views may 
provide insight into the effects of this type of regulation on different 
types of organizations. I explore this concept further in Part IV.156 
Interestingly, in addition to being one form of regulation 
considered by this work, SBNs are also the cause enabling the 
quantitative analysis used to compare directive regulation and 
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation. As discussed further in 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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Part III, the notification requirement of SBNs gives rise to sufficient 
security incident reporting to facilitate analysis of regulatory 
impact.157 Based on the data available, it seems unlikely a sufficient 
number of incidents would have been reported without these laws to 
allow statistically-valid analysis. 
B.   Management-Based Regulatory Delegation 
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is a mode of regulation 
under which administrative agencies, through legislative-mandated 
collaboration with regulatory stakeholders, promulgate regulations 
requiring regulated entities to develop plans designed to achieve 
certain aspirational goals laid out by the legislature. The regulatory 
goal in this case is the development of the compliance plan itself (and 
possible adherence to that plan), rather than the necessary 
achievement of stated goals or usage of certain means to achieve 
those goals, as is the case with directive regulation. 
This category of regulation is a combination of two threads of 
discussion in the current literature: 1) Coglianese and Lazer’s 
management-based regulation;158 and 2) Bamberger’s regulatory 
delegation.159 Management-based regulation relies on a concept of 
administrative agencies promulgating requirements that regulated 
entities develop (and possibly adhere to) compliance plans.160 The 
application of this paradigm, once decoupled from issues of timing, 
to information security regulation is relatively straightforward. It is, 
however, incomplete for two reasons. First, Coglianese and Lazer’s 
conception fails to capture the concept of legislatively-mandated 
involvement of private parties (regulatory capture). Second, 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See discussion infra Part III. 
 158. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24. 
 159. Bamberger, supra note 18, at 385; Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on 
the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 265–70 (2011) [hereinafter Bamberger & 
Mulligan, Privacy on the Books] (discussing the limited reach of privacy regulation in shaping privacy 
practices); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative 
Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 79-80 (2008) [hereinafter Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy 
Decisionmaking], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104728. 
 160. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 24, at 692. 
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management-based regulation alone fails to capture the degree to 
which organizations may be subject to other incentives not directly 
enshrined in but resulting from the structure of the regulation. 
As Bamberger (and later Bamberger and Mulligan) discuss,161 in 
certain contexts regulators lack the experience or resources necessary 
to understand and/or keep pace with the myriad different challenges 
facing regulated entities (particularly in heterogeneous 
industries162)163 or to promulgate regulations lacking relevance to 
guide business decision-makers (particularly in privacy matters).164 
The result is a circumstance in which, to move forward effectively, 
regulators must rely increasingly on input from regulated entities. 
Management-based regulation provides a solid foundation for such 
an approach but requires greater input from stakeholders than 
envisioned by Coglianese and Lazer to ensure the promulgated 
regulations setting forth compliance plan requirements are 
sufficiently robust to avoid a compliance “race to the bottom.”165 
This is particularly true in the context of information security, where 
regulators rely heavily on a concept of “reasonableness”—a concept 
traditionally understood in law, but lacking operational meaning in 
the context of information security due to a lack of an appropriate 
“reasonable person” standard166 and a lack of a well-agreed upon 
licensed professional standard upon which to rely for expert 
advice.167 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See generally Bamberger, supra note 18; Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra 
note 159; Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 159. 
 162. Heterogeneity among regulated entities is a particularly acute problem in the information 
security regulatory context since cybersecurity regulation generally targets entities whose core 
competency is not information security (or even information technology). The vast majority of 
organizations custodian to sensitive information regulated by the laws discussed here are in the 
healthcare or finance sectors, as well as other entities across all industrial sectors who handle substantial 
volumes of consumer records. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 163. Bamberger, supra note 18, at 387. 
 164. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 159, at 266. 
 165. Coglianese and Lazer supra note 24, 700–02; Thaw, supra note 55, at 30–31. 
 166. The “reasonable” layperson likely lacks any meaningful understanding of information security 
practices and certainly is incapable of evaluating those practices. 
 167. Many professional “certifications” exist, most notably the Certified Information Systems 
Security Professional (CISSP) certification, administered by the International Information System 
Security Certification Consortium ((ISC)2). However, to-date these certifications remain largely 
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By extending the concept of management-based regulation to 
include a concept of regulatory delegation to private entities 
(particularly with substantial involvement of private parties in the 
rulemaking process, as described above), the model proposed here 
addresses the concomitant challenges of a rapidly evolving regulatory 
climate, substantial heterogeneity among regulated entities, and a 
need for sufficiently well-defined regulations so as to avoid a 
regulatory “race to the bottom” in an environment relying heavily 
upon but lacking a good definition of “reasonableness.”168 
Thus, merging the concepts of management-based regulation and 
regulatory delegation provides a category into which to group 
information security laws and regulations for the purposes of 
comparison. The sections that follow examine this combination of 
principles in the context of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),169 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Financial Modernization Act (GLBA),170 and the regulatory 
jurisprudence of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)171 through its 
enforcement actions and consent decrees on information security 
matters. The combination of these two themes in regulation allows 
these three core areas of information security regulation to be 
understood together. Understanding them together is important 
because of the degree to which their evolution relied upon one 
another and as a result the degree to which they share common 
characteristics as a class of regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
vocational training certificates and do not equate to the standard of “learned professionals” the law often 
turns to in complex areas such as science, medicine, and engineering where a “reasonable person” 
standard cannot be adopted from the average layperson. See generally Certified Information Systems 
Security Professional, (ISC)2, https://www.isc2.org/cissp/default.aspxhttps://www.isc2.org/ (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2014). 
 168. Curiously, this merger of the need for flexibility as to response with a lack of definition as to 
compliant appears to parallel the traditional philosophical quandary of concurrently needing both 
structure and flexibility. It may be worth exploring further to determine under what other circumstances 
(i.e., what other regulatory contexts) this set of circumstances may arise and whether the blended 
regulation solution proposed herein may be applicable. 
 169. See infra Part II.1. 
 170. See infra Part II.2. 
 171. See infra Part II.3. 
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1.   Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Security 
and Privacy Rules (HIPAA) 
HIPAA was passed in 1996 as part of a broad effort to reform 
various aspects of the healthcare and health insurance systems in the 
United States.172 As part of the legislation, Congress included 
provisions with respect to the information security of certain 
information describing the identity, medical conditions, and finances 
of individuals.173 This information is collectively termed Protected 
Health Information (PHI)174 and includes information created or 
received by entities involved in the healthcare process relating to the 
health condition or care of an individual.175 
The provisions pertaining to information security apply to any 
organization which is a Covered Entity or (under certain 
circumstances) a Business Associate of a Covered Entity.176 Covered 
Entities generally include health (insurance) plans, healthcare 
information clearinghouses, and healthcare providers.177 Business 
Associates generally include any organization that works with a 
Covered Entity and handles PHI on behalf of or to provide services to 
the Covered Entity.178 Although there has been some discussion as to 
the applicability of various aspects of the term Business Associate, 
these definitions generally mean that the HIPAA Security Rule 
applies to all healthcare insurance organizations, processing 
organizations that support healthcare insurance organizations, 
medical providers (if they use electronic records), and any other 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2006). 
 174. Originally the statute described this information as “Individually Identifiable Health 
Information.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6). The implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Health and Human Services collectively termed information subject to HIPAA’s Privacy and Security 
rules as “Protected Health Information.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6)(B). 
 176. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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entities that engage in business with them if that business transaction 
involves the exchange or handling of PHI.179 
The HIPAA Security Rule comprises two key elements: (1) a 
statutory instruction by Congress for the Department of Health and 
Human Services to promulgate regulations establishing information 
security standards for the handling of PHI180 and (2) a general 
instruction to organizations covered by the Rule that they maintain 
appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.181 The 
first element is the key provision under which specific information 
security regulations part of HIPAA are promulgated. It generally 
requires that the regulations take into account available technologies, 
costs of security measures, training needs, the value of various 
security measures, and the varying sizes of healthcare organizations 
and providers.182 
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services pursuant to this provision183 are too numerous to list 
here in a comprehensive fashion, and doing so would not 
substantially illuminate the discussion of characterizing HIPAA’s 
Security Rule as a regulatory device. Rather, it is worth examining 
the method by which the regulations are promulgated and the 
substantive breadth of resultant regulations in the context of the 
ISPL. 
HIPAA is a hybrid form of management-based regulation. It 
exhibits the classic characteristics of management-based regulation, 
requiring firms to conduct risk assessments and develop plans to 
address the identified risks.184 The HIPAA regulations also specify 
certain protection measures that regulated organizations must 
undertake, similar to means-based regulation.185 Unlike traditional 
means-based regulation, however, the regulations do not specify the 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Id. 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(1) (2006). 
 181. Id. § 1320d-2(d)(2). 
 182. Id. § 1320d-2(d). 
 183. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102–.534 (2013). 
 184. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2). 
 185. Id. 
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implementation details for those measures. Rather, such regulations 
explicitly leave those implementation details to the regulated 
entities.186 
HIPAA involves a notice-and-comment process with legislative 
direction to give deference to key stakeholders.187 Specifically, it 
requires the Department of Health and Human Services to consult 
with the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, which 
comprises key stakeholders from industry, government, and 
academia.188 
The regulations promulgated under the HIPAA Security Rule bear 
many aspects of traditional management-based regulation under 
Coglianese and Lazer’s typology. The general requirements189 and 
flexibility of approach190 specified in the general rules for security 
standards require organizations to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of electronic medical records, protect 
against reasonably anticipated threats, and ensure workforce 
compliance.191 
This general requirement that organizations engage in 
comprehensive activities to protect their information assets typifies 
management-based regulation. The “flexibility of approach” 
provision effectively delegates the responsibility for planning these 
activities to the regulated entity, thereby exhibiting the classic form 
of management-based regulation. This provision provides that 
covered entities may use any security measures reasonably and 
appropriately capable of achieving the specific security goals and 
requires that the entity take into account its size, scope, complexity, 
current technical infrastructure, costs, and levels of risk in making 
such determinations as to reasonableness.192 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(5). 
 188. Id. § 1320d-2(a)(5)(B). 
 189. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2013). 
 190. Id. § 164.306(b). 
 191. Id. § 164.306(a)–(b). 
 192. Id. § 164.306(b). 
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Furthermore, in addition to this flexibility of approach, the 
regulations specifically require regulated entities to “[c]onduct an 
accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and 
vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
electronic protected health information held by the covered 
entity . . . .”193 and to “[i]mplement security measures sufficient to 
reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level 
to comply with § 164.306(a).”194 These directives to conduct risk 
assessments and implement security measures consistent with those 
risk assessments are perfect examples of traditional management-
based regulation. 
The HIPAA Security Rule is far more expansive, however, than 
the assessment and planning requirements outlined above. Unlike 
traditional management-based regulation, it goes on to detail highly-
specific elements the plan must contain—almost taking it to the 
degree of means-based regulation, but stopping short by leaving the 
details of implementation to the discretion of the regulated entity 
consistent with the flexibility of approach provisions outlined 
above.195 Consider the following four provisions of the HIPAA 
Security Rule regulations: 
(i) Unique user identification (Required). Assign a unique name 
and/or number for identifying and tracking user identity. 
(ii) Emergency access procedure (Required). Establish (and 
implement as needed) procedures for obtaining necessary 
electronic protected health information during an emergency. 
(iii) Automatic logoff (Addressable). Implement electronic 
procedures that terminate an electronic session after a 
predetermined time of inactivity. 
(iv) Encryption and decryption (Addressable). Implement a 
mechanism to encrypt and decrypt electronic protected health 
                                                                                                                 
 193. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2013). 
 194. Id. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B). 
 195. Id. § 164.306(b). 
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information.196 
The four provisions are the “implementation specifications” for the 
“standard” specified in 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2) governing access 
control, which states that regulated organizations must “[i]mplement 
technical policies and procedures for electronic information systems 
that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access 
only to those persons or software programs that have been granted 
access rights as specified in § 164.308(a)(4).”197 The standard clearly 
resembles management-based regulation, but the implementation 
specifications diverge from traditional management-based regulation 
by clearly targeting the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the 
ISPL.198 This bifurcated approach is replicated in nearly all sections 
of the regulations implementing the HIPAA Security Rule, thus 
suggesting that HIPAA is also management-based regulation that 
targets the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the ISPL.199 As 
discussed in Part IV, this bifurcation has implications for the 
relationship between senior managers and information security 
professionals at regulated organizations.200 
2.   Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act (GLBA) 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999201 
specifies requirements for the Financial Institutions Safeguards Rule 
(Safeguards).202 The Safeguards require that certain federal financial 
regulators promulgate regulations establishing standards for 
                                                                                                                 
 196. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2) (2013). 
 197. Id. § 164.312(a)(1). 
 198. Thaw, supra note 55, at 43. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 201. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29 
U.S.C.). 
 202. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012). 
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administrative, technical, and physical safeguards against information 
security threats to consumer financial data.203 
The Safeguards require each of the agencies204 charged with 
enforcing the provisions of GLBA to promulgate regulations 
implementing the Rule.205 The FTC has promulgated a series of 
regulations pursuant to the Safeguards, which they call the 
“Safeguards Rule.”206 The OCC, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and 
the OTS jointly issued regulations, which they call the “Interagency 
Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to 
Customer Information and Consumer Notice” (“Interagency 
Guidelines”).207 I examine each of these two sets of regulations to 
illustrate that GLBA, like HIPAA, is also a form of bifurcated 
management-based regulation targeting both the Design/Planning 
Stage of the ISPL and the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the 
ISPL. Collectively these cover all organizations included in the CISO 
interviews.208 Based on those interviews, the author’s experience in 
private practice, and discussions with practitioners, these rules 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Id. 
 204. At the time of its enactment, GLBA charged seven federal regulatory agencies with enforcing the 
privacy and security provisions of the Act, specifically including promulgating regulations to implement 
these provisions of GLBA. These agencies included: (1) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC); (2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systems (Federal Reserve); (3) the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); (4) the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS); (5) the Board of the 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); (6) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); 
and (7) the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 15 U.S.C. §§ 6805(a), 6809(2) (2012). Section 6805(a)(6) 
technically permits state insurance regulators to engage in enforcement of the GLBA Safeguards Rule, 
however considering the actions of state regulators in this regard is outside the scope of analysis for this 
paper. It is unclear why the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which has other 
regulatory roles under GLBA, was not explicitly listed in Section 6805(a). This is particularly 
interesting considering the CFTC recently promulgated regulations pursuant to the GLBA Privacy rule. 
Joshua Lynch, CFTC Proposes Rules on Affiliate Marketing, Data Disposal, and GLBA Privacy, 
CHRON. DATA PROTECTION, http://www.hldataprotection.com/2010/10/articles/financial-privacy/cftc-
proposes-rules-on-affiliate-marketing-data-disposal-and-glba-privacy/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
 205. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b). 
 206. 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2013). 
 207. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information 
and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15736-01 (Mar. 29, 2005) (codified at scattered sections of 12 
C.F.R. pt. 30). 
 208. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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comprise the bulk of financial regulatory rules driving information 
security compliance.209 
GLBA has some aspects that suggest Congress intended to involve 
industry in the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. 
Additionally, as discussed in Part IV, the CISO interviews revealed 
that financial institutions had substantial incentive to participate in 
this process.210 While not as stark an example as HIPAA, it appears 
that Congress’s intent with respect to GLBA was more oriented 
toward a regulatory delegation model than toward the traditional 
notice-and-comment process.211 
a.   The FTC GLBA “Safeguards Rule” 
The FTC regulations are particularly notable because, as discussed 
in Part II, the Safeguards Rule guided certain key elements of the 
FTC’s jurisprudence in their privacy and data security enforcement 
actions.212 The implementing regulations promulgated by the FTC 
specify that regulated entities must develop, implement, and maintain 
comprehensive written information security programs addressing 
administrative, technical, and physical risks to the security and 
confidentiality of customer information.213 
These regulations are a classic example of management-based 
regulation. They require individual-regulated organizations to 
develop plans appropriate to each organization’s size, scope, and 
complexity to achieve a set of specified objectives related to 
information security. The objectives are described in broad 
categories, directing the organization but leaving wide discretion to 
innovate in selecting approaches for compliance. This is precisely 
                                                                                                                 
 209. Not discussed in this work are the information security guidelines promulgated by the Internal 
Revenue Service. These guidelines generally apply to few entities and, as yet, there is no evidence they 
drive compliance effects on a significant scale. 
 210. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 211. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 5136A(a)(5), 113 
Stat. 1338, 1374 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 
18 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.). 
 212. 16 C.F.R. § 314.2(c) (2013). 
 213. Id. 
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consistent with the concept of management-based regulation 
discussed above. 
The FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rule goes on to provide some 
limited additional specification as to what each information security 
program shall contain, requiring that “[i]n order to develop, 
implement, and maintain [an] information security program, 
[regulated organizations] shall” engage in a specified series of 
activities to design and maintain that plan.214 These generally include 
designation of specific employee(s) with responsibility for the plan, 
identification of reasonably foreseeable security risks, development 
of controls and procedures to mitigate those risks, oversight of 
service providers to ensure their activities are consistent with the 
plan, and periodic evaluation and revision of the information security 
plan.215 
These specifications are not so overly detailed with respect to 
implementation so as to suggest a means-based character of 
regulation, nor do they sufficiently interfere in that regard so as to 
suggest targeting of the Implementation/Maintenance Stage. The 
FTC’s guidelines, however, do have an interesting requirement of 
regulated organizations to “regularly test or otherwise monitor the 
effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems and 
procedures”216 and “[e]valuat[ing] and adjust[ing] [the] information 
security program in light of the results of [that testing].”217 This 
regular testing and evaluation requirement speaks directly to 
outcomes and, in this regard, targets the Output/Efficacy Stage of the 
ISPL. This is reinforced by the evaluation and adjustment 
requirement which, while effectively requiring the organization to 
repeat the risk assessment process at regular intervals, ties the 
conduct of those repeated assessments to the outcomes sufficiently to 
                                                                                                                 
 214. Id. § 314.4. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. § 314.4(c). 
 217. Id. § 314.4(e). 
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suggest that the Output/Efficacy Stage is substantially targeted by 
this regulation.218 
b.   The GLBA Interagency Guidelines on Information  
Security 
The GLBA Interagency Guidelines on Information Security differ 
from the FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rule in that they are a form of 
bifurcated management-based regulation that targets both the 
Design/Planning and Implementation/Maintenance Stages of the 
ISPL. The bifurcation present in the Interagency Guidelines is 
structurally very similar to that present in HIPAA. 
The Interagency Guidelines begin with a general directive 
specifying that each organization shall design and implement a 
written information security plan, addressing administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards and considering the nature and 
scope of the regulated entity, designed to ensure the security and 
confidentiality of customer information and protecting against threats 
to that information.219 Interestingly, unlike some other general 
directives, this one also includes a specific reference to data disposal 
requirements.220 
Just as with the FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rule above, these 
regulations represent a classic example of management-based 
regulation. They require individual regulated organizations to 
develop plans appropriate to each organization’s size, scope, and 
complexity to achieve a set of specified objectives related to 
information security.221 The objectives are described in broad 
categories, directing the organization but leaving it wide discretion to 
innovate in selecting approaches for compliance.222 
Like the HIPAA regulations discussed above, the Interagency 
Guidelines also specify in detail what elements an information 
                                                                                                                 
 218. Thaw, supra note 55, at 46. 
 219. 12 C.F.R. § 30, App. B § (II) (2013). 
 220. Id. § (II)(B)(4). 
 221. Id. § (II)(A). 
 222. Id. 
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security program must contain and what goals those elements much 
achieve.223 Generally, they include requirements for access controls, 
encryption, administrative procedures, segregation of duties, 
employee background checks, system monitoring (specifically 
including intrusion detection), incident response, training, and regular 
testing of systems.224 
The Interagency Guidelines lack the details as to implementation, 
however, that would qualify a means-based classification of their 
regulatory style. Nonetheless, the degree of detail as to areas that 
must be covered substantially interferes at the 
Implementation/Maintenance Stage so as to conclude that these 
regulations are a form of management-based regulation that targets 
the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the ISPL. Interestingly, 
unlike the FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rules, the Interagency 
Guidelines lack the ongoing re-evaluation requirement that targets 
the Output/Efficacy Stage of the ISPL.225 
3.   FTC Enforcement Action/Jurisprudence 
Beginning in the early 2000s, the Federal Trade Commission 
conducted investigations into and brought enforcement actions 
against organizations that exhibited poor information security 
practices in the handling of personal information, sensitive 
information, or both.226 Their primary statutory basis227 for doing so 
                                                                                                                 
 223. Id. § (III)(A–B). 
 224. Id. § (III)(C). 
 225. Compare 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(e) (2013) (GLBA Safeguards), with 12 C.F.R. § 30, App. B 
(Interagency Guidelines). 
 226. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 144 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Christopher Wolf, Enforcement and Policy at the FTC and the 
Impact on Businesses, BrightTALK (Apr. 8, 2010), https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/288/20491. 
 227. There are a number of other secondary statutory bases upon which the FTC rests its data security 
enforcement actions, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81u), the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x), the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (codified in 
scattered parts of 42 U.S.C.)), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act (discussed above 
in Part II.2), and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–05). For the purposes 
of this section, with the exception of GLBA, these secondary bases are unimportant as to the 
classification of the FTC’s jurisprudence according to my revised typology of information security 
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was Section 5 of the FTC Act, which grants the Commission the 
authority to investigate and challenge business practices it finds 
unfair or deceptive.228 Pursuant to this authority, the FTC brought 
several enforcement actions229 against organizations it believed to 
have engaged in “unfair or deceptive” information security practices 
that violate Section 5.230 Generally speaking, the Commission 
asserted as “deceptive” those practices where organizations promised 
one level of security and failed to deliver that level of security,231 and 
asserted as “unfair” those practices where organizations failed to 
provide a reasonable and appropriate level of security in protecting 
sensitive and/or personal information.232 
In practice, nearly all these matters result in a settlement between 
the organization under investigation and the Commission.233 These 
settlements generally include the following elements: (1) an 
agreement to discontinue, correct the offending information security 
practices; or both,234 and (2) an agreement to engage in ongoing 
periodic information security assessments the results of which must 
be attested to by a certified professional.235 In rare circumstances 
where the violation alleged is so severe and the resultant consumer 
                                                                                                                 
regulation. 
 228. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). 
 229. In a few notable cases where the Commission deemed it appropriate, in conjunction with the 
Department of Justice, the FTC brought actions in federal district court rather than as an enforcement 
action. The effective result was the same, with those matters reaching settlement under the jurisdiction 
of the court rather than a consent decree under the jurisdiction of the Commission. See, e.g., Complaint 
for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief, United States v. Choicepoint, Inc., 
No. 06-CV-0198 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2006), 2006 WL 236338; Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for 
Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief, United States v. Choicepoint, Inc., 
No. 06-CV-0198 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/cases/2006/01/stipfinaljudgement.pdf (regarding the form of settlement). 
 230. See, e.g., In re Twitter, Inc., No. C-4316, 2011 WL 914034 (F.T.C. Mar. 2, 2011); In re 
Microsoft Corp., 134 F.T.C. 709 (2002). 
 231. Twitter, Inc., 2011 WL 914034, at *4; Microsoft Corp., 134 F.T.C. 709, 748-50. 
 232. In re TJX Cos., No. C-4227, 2008 WL 3150421, at *2 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008); In re BJ’s 
Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 WL 2395788, at *2 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005). 
 233. See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 WL 2395788, at *2. 
 234. See, e.g., In re DSW Inc., File No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974, at *4 (F.T.C. Dec. 1, 2005) 
(requiring DSW to implement a “comprehensive information security program”). 
 235. See, e.g., DSW Inc., 2005 WL 3366974, at *4–5 (explaining that certain certified (as opposed to 
licensed) professional(s) are eligible to certify these assessments). 
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harm alleged so grievous, the Commission may also require 
compensatory or punitive damages.236 These consent decrees and 
settlements form the basis for the aspects of FTC data security 
enforcement used herein to classify the regulatory style of the 
Commission’s jurisprudence. Generally, the FTC’s style of 
regulation is a mix between management-based regulation and 
means-based regulation targeting all stages of the ISPL. 
The initial and ongoing risk assessment requirement of the FTC’s 
GLBA Safeguards Rule is best described as a bifurcated style of 
management-based regulation that targets both the Design/Planning 
and the Efficacy/Output Stages of the ISPL. This is perhaps 
unsurprising, given that the Commission identified in a 2005 
prepared statement to Congress that it based its risk assessment 
requirements in its enforcement action consent decrees upon those 
requirements in the Safeguards Rule: 
To date, the Commission has brought five cases against 
companies for deceptive security claims, alleging that the 
companies made explicit or implicit promises to take reasonable 
steps to protect sensitive consumer information. Because they 
allegedly failed to take such steps, their claims were deceptive. 
The consent orders settling these cases have required the 
companies to implement rigorous information security programs 
generally conforming to the standards set forth in the GLBA 
Safeguards Rule.237 
Like the risk assessment requirements in HIPAA and GLBA, the 
risk assessment requirements under the FTC’s enforcement action 
settlements require organizations to engage in an initial risk 
assessment within a specified period of time, develop an information 
                                                                                                                 
 236. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1994) (stating that such matters often end up in federal district court). 
 237. Enhancing Data Security: The Regulators’ Perspective: Hearing Before theSubcomm. on Fin. 
Inst. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 14 (2005) (prepared statement of 
the Federal Trade Commission delivered by Lydia Parnes, Director of the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection of the Federal Trade Commission) (citations omitted). 
52
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss2/1
2014] THE EFFICACY OF CYBERSECURITY REGULATION 339 
security plan consistent with that risk assessment, conduct periodic 
assessments thereafter, and update their information security plans 
accordingly.238 
The provisions pertaining to the conduct of an initial risk 
assessment and development of an initial information security 
program are classic examples of a management-based style of 
regulation, with the slight exception that they are the result of an 
enforcement action by an administrative agency and apply to a 
specific organization rather than the result of rules promulgated by an 
administrative agency and applicable to all regulated entities 
thereunder. However, this difference does not change the functional 
character of the regulation. The provisions detailing what substantive 
areas the assessment and plan must cover are sufficiently broad so as 
neither to implicate a functional character of means-based regulation 
nor to interfere substantially at the Implementation/Maintenance 
Stage of the ISPL. The intent of the regulation clearly is targeted 
because the requirements are the result of an enforcement action 
against a specific organization. Thus the classification of the 
regulation in this regard is management-based regulation targeting 
the Design/Planning Stage of the ISPL. 
The FTC’s settlements also include requirements for ongoing risk 
assessments and updating of the information security program as 
appropriate based on the results of those ongoing assessments.239 
This regular assessment requirement speaks directly to information 
security outcomes and, therefore, targets the Output/Efficacy Stage of 
the ISPL. This intent characterization is reinforced by the updating 
requirement, which sufficiently ties the conduct of the periodic 
assessments to the outcomes to suggest that the Output/Efficacy 
Stage is substantially targeted by this regulation. Thus, the 
classification of the regulation in this regard is management-based 
regulation targeting the Output/Efficacy Stage of the ISPL. 
Therefore, similar to the FTC’s GLBA Safeguards Rule, the FTC’s 
                                                                                                                 
 238. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 WL 2395788, at *2. 
 239. Id. 
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enforcement actions—as they pertain to the subjects of the 
enforcement—are management-based regulation targeting each of the 
Design/Planning Stage and the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of 
the ISPL. 
a.   Indirect Consequences of FTC Enforcement Actions240 
The FTC enforcement actions and settlements contain provisions 
identifying the offending practices as “unfair” or “deceptive” and 
require the subject of the enforcement action to discontinue the 
offending practices.241 This is a classic form of means-based 
regulation, whereby the subject of the enforcement action is required 
to discontinue use of a specific practice, procedure, or technology. 
Consider the case involving Reed Elsevier, Inc. and Seisint, Inc.242 
In this enforcement action, the FTC alleged that Reed Elsevier and 
Seisint (which was subsequently acquired by Reed Elsevier) failed to 
utilize sufficient authentication procedures with respect to verifying 
the identity and authorization of users of its consumer information 
services.243 The FTC alleged that verified incidents of identity theft 
resulted from these failures.244 
In this part of the complaint, the Commission effectively created a 
list of specific requirements that any comprehensive information 
security program satisfying the requirements of the consent decree 
would be required to implement.245 By effectively requiring the 
                                                                                                                 
 240. This section provides a (perhaps digressive) discussion of aspects of FTC enforcement that are 
not exactly Management-Based Regulatory Delegation. These aspects, or rather the effects of these 
aspects, are intertwined with the primary management-based aspects of the regulation. They are notable 
as matters of discussion in the context of this work because, as noted at the end of this section, they are 
consistent with and foreshadow recommendations that flow from the quantitative analysis presented. See 
discussion infra Part III. 
 241. See, e.g., In re Reed Elsevier, Inc. & Seisint, Inc., File No. C-4226, 2008 WL 3150420 (F.T.C. 
July 29, 2008). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at *1–2. 
 244. Id. at *3. 
 245. Id. at *7 (“Each Assessment shall: A. set forth the specific administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards that respondent has implemented and maintained during the reporting period; B. explain how 
such safeguards are appropriate to respondent’s size and complexity, the nature and scope of 
respondent’s activities, and the sensitivity of the personal information collected from or about 
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respondent organization to address these specific technical measures, 
the FTC engaged in a form of means-based regulation. The 
regulation obviously targeted the specific respondent. While some of 
the items identified above would require design and planning 
changes to resolve, the post-facto nature of this regulation—by the 
function of it being an enforcement action, not a proactive set of 
promulgated regulations—suggests it is more appropriately 
characterized as targeting the Implementation/Maintenance Stage as 
it will affect systems already in use by the respondent. Thus, this 
aspect of FTC enforcement is best classified as means-based 
regulation targeting the Implementation/Maintenance Stage of the 
ISPL. 
The identification of alleged unfair or deceptive information 
security practices by the FTC in its various complaints has created a 
curious effect in how those involved in information security practice 
perceive the regulatory requirements to which they are subject. In 
short, the specific practices identified by the Commission in its 
complaints have resulted in rules that organizations must follow—
specifically, organizations must not engage in those practices 
identified in the complaints as unfair or deceptive. 
This is a curious effect, because notwithstanding the analysis 
above, no formal statute or regulation actually requires organizations 
(other than the subjects of the enforcement actions) to avoid such 
practices. There is only the threat of future enforcement by the FTC 
that drives such “compliance.” From the practitioner’s perspective, 
this may be an overly fine distinction. If a client asks whether an 
activity is permissible under federal law, and the Commission has 
identified it as potentially violative of Section 5 of the FTC Act, the 
practical answer to the client is almost assuredly to avoid the 
allegedly offending practice. Consider, for example, the reply of one 
CISO of a large information technology company who described the 
                                                                                                                 
consumers; C. explain how the safeguards that have been implemented meet or exceed the protections 
required by Paragraph I of this order; and D. certify that respondent’s security program is operating with 
sufficient effectiveness to provide reasonable assurance that the security, confidentiality, and integrity of 
personal information is protected and has so operated throughout the reporting period.”). 
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TJX enforcement action as providing some definable guidance as to 
what not to do: 
. . . so there are some don’t do mechanisms that we apply by 
process that are also helped by regulation because if we didn’t 
have that [regulation] to test to we might not think about it today. 
We couldn’t get to it [that information security practice]. It 
wouldn’t be like, ‘Oh, gosh, the TJ Maxx incident is pretty 
good.’”246 
This respondent identifies the TJ Maxx incident as supporting their 
efforts to advance certain (desirable) information security practices 
and suggests that absent the FTC’s enforcement action in response to 
the incident, they might not be able to defend those practices within 
their organization.247 
Collectively, the discussion above identifies ways in which FTC 
enforcement actions result in de facto regulations affecting each stage 
of the ISPL. While the empirical evidence in this regard is 
preliminary, it is consistent with the conclusions from the 
quantitative comparisons presented in Part III.248 
III.   QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS: TRACKING SECURITY BREACH 
INCIDENCE 
In many areas of regulation, such as pollution control and food 
safety, quantitative measures provide critical insight into regulatory 
efficacy. Information security poses a somewhat more difficult 
challenge in this regard, because it—by definition—lacks a control 
population against which to test effectiveness of security measures.249 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Thaw, supra note 55, at 54. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See discussion infra Part III. 
 249. This is because it is impossible to gather data either: (1) on the total number of attacks underway, 
since not all attacks can be identified at the time of engagement (e.g., zero-day vulnerabilities); or (2) on 
the number of attacks a fully-protected machine would withstand. The former is impossible both 
because of the lack of a global structure for comprehensive surveillance and because so-called “zero-
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Those attempting to evaluate security effectiveness are faced with the 
difficult challenge of “proving a negative”—showing that the reason 
no catastrophic events occurred was the result of onerous security 
measures. These measurement difficulties, in turn, make 
quantitatively evaluating the efficacy of regulatory measures based 
on successes difficult. 
This work utilizes an alternate approach, measuring security 
failures. Rather than looking at reductions in contaminants released 
or bacterial infestations, it examines security breach incidence. This 
approach, perhaps akin to measuring incidence of bacterial 
infestation in infected foodstuffs, attempts to illuminate regulatory 
efficacy by investigating the degree to which organizations take steps 
to improve their security measures after the introduction of 
regulation as measured by reductions in reported incidents. 
A.   Tracking Breaches of Personal Information (2000–2010) 
Historically there has always been some nominal reporting of 
security breach incidents. For the purposes of this analysis, a 
“security breach” constitutes an event involving unauthorized access 
to sensitive information, primarily as defined by the applicable state 
SBNs but broadly construed so as to include other incidents that may 
involve sensitive data but that fail to meet the strict triggering 
                                                                                                                 
day” attacks, by definition, cannot be detected at the time they are underway (because of the 
vulnerability they exploit and, therefore, the signature of the attack is known only to the attacker). 
Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 63, 64 
n.7 (2010) (“A zero-day attack is a previously unseen attack on a previously unknown vulnerability. The 
term refers to the fact that the vulnerability has been known to the defender for zero days. The adversary 
has usually known of the attack for a much longer time.”). The latter is impossible because a “fully-
protected” machine only exists in a vacuum—one completely disconnected from any network and 
locked in an impenetrable facility. The widely-varying business requirements of operational production 
environments in organizations require that some risk exposure occur; otherwise, it would be impossible 
for information systems to provide any services. Thus a “control group” against which to test live, 
production systems cannot effectively be constructed on a global scale. Note, however, that with 
sufficient public funding, it may be possible to construct an environment that mimics production 
environments sufficiently to capture data and use for later analysis. While not a control group for the 
purposes of comparison, such an environment would provide substantial useful information for the 
purposes of analysis. Currently, however, no such (unclassified) proposals have received sufficient 
funding to expect this as a usable data source in the near future. 
57
Thaw: The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation
Published by Reading Room, 2013
344 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
guidelines to contain consumer information. The primary data source 
is a database of such incidents maintained by the Open Security 
Foundation.250 The period of analysis presented here is from January 
1, 2000 through December 31, 2010.251 
Traditional definitions of public versus private sector entities—
definitions that rely upon the for-profit status of an organization—do 
not accurately reflect the demarcations recognized by the various 
data security laws. Furthermore, following such a strict rule would 
make examination of the healthcare sector difficult, as organizational 
boundaries with respect to data ownership are not as clear as 
organizational boundaries with respect to for-profit status.252 
Accordingly, the final scope of inquiry extends beyond traditional 
private firms to include organizations like hospitals and universities. 
This treatment mirrors that of some state security breach notification 
statutes, which apply separate requirements to governmental and 
non-governmental entities, but do not distinguish between for-profit 
and non-profit organizations.253 Those states that do not have 
separate statutes for government organizations also make no 
distinction between for-profit and non-profit organizations.254 Post-
                                                                                                                 
 250. Open Security Foundation DATALOSSDB, www.datalossdb.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). A 
collection of the incidents reported by the Open Security Foundation is on file with the author. 
 251. As of late calendar year 2011, the data used in this analysis is no longer being made publicly 
available by the Open Security Foundation. Repeated inquiries to the curators of the data regarding 
accessing it for research purposes have gone unanswered. Currently, this dataset is the only 
(unclassified) one of its kind available in the world. 
 252. Consider, for example, a research hospital. The hospital itself and any affiliated medical college 
will be non-profit entities. The physicians within the hospital, however, are likely classified as 
independent contractors. When practicing medicine at their “private offices,” they operate as 
Professional Corporations, (Limited Liability) Partnerships, and other for-profit organizations under 
state law. While these two “organizations” are distinct for fiscal purposes, they almost always share 
patient records. Furthermore, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH Act) effectively requires such information sharing in order to meet certain guidelines for 
federal funding. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 253. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/12 (2012) (creating separate statutory notification 
requirements for state agencies experiencing data breaches and requiring additional reporting, including 
in some cases to consumer reporting agencies); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 3(c) (2007) (mandating 
additional centralized reporting requirements for entities experiencing a security breach if they are state 
executive branch agencies). 
 254. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (2008) (defining “business” as “a sole proprietorship, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other group, however organized, and whether or not organized 
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secondary educational institutions, therefore, unlike government 
institutions, are mostly subject to the same requirements under state 
breach notification laws as are private firms.255 Primary and 
secondary educational institutions, however, are traditionally so 
interwoven with state and local governments that considering them 
separately would be difficult.256 Also included are “general” non-
profit organizations such as charitable foundations and research 
institutions. As with private universities and hospitals, non-profits are 
treated the same under state security breach notification statutes as 
are private for-profit entities.257 
1.   Dataset and Variables 
The primary dataset comprises a collection of publicly-known 
security breach incidents maintained by the Open Security 
Foundation (OSF) known as the DataLossDB database.258 As 
described by the OSF: 
DataLossDB is a research project aimed at documenting known 
and reported data loss incidents world-wide. The effort is now a 
community one, and with the move to Open Security 
Foundation’s DataLossDB.org, asks for contributions of new 
incidents and new data for existing incidents.259 
Until early 2011, the database was an open-source effort, similar to 
Wikipedia, that relied upon the contributions of individuals 
worldwide to submit known incidents for review.260 Only limited 
                                                                                                                 
to operate at a profit.”) (emphasis added). 
 255. In some states (e.g., Illinois) state land-grant universities likely fall under the scope of 
governmental entities. In others (e.g., Massachusetts) they probably do not. 
 256. Judith A. Winston, Achieving Excellence and Equal Opportunity in Education: No Conflict of 
Laws, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 997, 1003 (2001) (recognizing that state and local governments are jointly 
responsible for primary and secondary education). 
 257. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1. 
 258. About OSF Data Loss, DATALOSSDB, http://datalossdb.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
 259. Id. 
 260. About DataLossDB, DATALOSSDB, http://datalossdb.org/about (last visited Sept. 17, 2013). 
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information regarding the methods of collecting data is available, and 
suggests that the curators rely primarily on news media and public 
information requests.261 Although somewhat detailed, these 
descriptions lack specificity as to the statistical significance of their 
sampling methods. 
This lack of specification as to how incidents are captured does 
present a methodological problem. As of the time of analysis, 
however, no better resources were available, and this dataset serves 
the purpose of allowing analysis on a dataset that at least is likely to 
exhibit normally distributed error,262 to the extent error in reporting 
exists. Notable limitations include the incentive for organizations not 
to disclose incidents that represent breaches of security but escape the 
technical reporting requirements (e.g., does not involve a covered 
combination of personal information but otherwise involve sensitive 
information) and the fact that there is no baseline for comparison 
(i.e., there is no database indicating what incidents have not been 
reported). Considering these limitations, as discussed below, the 
focus on measuring only relative changes over time is appropriate. 
2.   Analysis Groups: Previously Regulated and Previously 
Unregulated Entities 
Categorizing existing information security law and regulation into 
two groups allows the empirical comparison of the efficacy of those 
styles of regulation. The first group, directive regulation, comprises 
the state Security Breach Notification laws (SBNs), and the second 
group, Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, comprises 
HIPAA, GLBA, and the FTC’s Section 5 privacy and information 
security enforcement activity. The chronological order in which these 
statutes were enacted allows quantitative comparison of their efficacy 
                                                                                                                 
 261. See id. 
 262. Each of the SBNs are laws of general applicability and, thus there is no reason to believe any 
industry will have a reporting bias as a function of lack of access to reported incidents. For the purpose 
of this analysis, I assume that all actors are rational with respect to reporting incidents as required under 
the law once the organizations become aware of their reporting obligations, a condition not necessarily 
coincident with when those organizations actually became subject to those obligations. 
60
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss2/1
2014] THE EFFICACY OF CYBERSECURITY REGULATION 347 
by grouping organizations into two classes based on the type(s) of 
regulation to which they were subject at various points. HIPAA was 
enacted in 1996,263 and the Final Security Rule took effect in 2003.264 
GLBA was enacted in 1999,265 the Interagency Guidelines became 
effective in 2001,266 and the Safeguards Rule became effective in 
2003.267 The state SBNs varied in their effective dates, beginning in 
2003 with many being enacted toward the end of the decade.268 The 
FTC’s privacy and data security enforcement, as discussed in Part 
II,269 began in 2000 but did not substantially gain traction or attention 
among regulated entities until much later in the decade, as discussed 
in Part IV.270 
SBNs are the primary drivers of security incident reporting in the 
United States and were introduced in large scale several years after 
the effective dates of HIPAA and GLBA.271 This chronology 
suggests grouping organizations according to whether they were 
previously subject to regulation at the time SBNs began to drive 
reporting. The first group, Previously Regulated Entities (PREs), 
comprises organizations primarily in the healthcare or finance sectors 
that were subject to HIPAA or GLBA prior to the introduction of 
SBNs. The second group, Previously Unregulated Entities (PUEs), 
comprises organizations in most other sectors which previously were 
not subject to information security regulation.272 Because the FTC’s 
                                                                                                                 
 263. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 264. 16 C.F.R. § 314.5(a) (2013). 
 265. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 29 
U.S.C.). 
 266. 12 C.F.R. § 30, App. B § (III)(G) (2013). 
 267. 16 C.F.R. § 314.5(a) (2013). 
 268. State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41. 
 269. See discussion supra Part II. 
 270. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 271. State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41. 
 272. While some limited corner cases existed, including Department of Defense regulations, IRS 
regulations, and those few organizations that drew the attention of the FTC in the early 2000s, these 
instances are so small as not to bias the analysis. Furthermore, at that point in time—particularly with 
large organizations at a time when security was not taken seriously as a business need—it would be 
difficult to assume that such limited-scope regulations would be likely to drive costly, organization-wide 
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enforcement jurisprudence did not appear to gain attention among 
regulated entities until late in the 2000s, it is excluded as a category 
for the purpose of quantitative analysis.273 
As of February 17, 2011, the DataLossDB dataset contained 3,076 
breach reports from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2010.274 
2,575 were experienced by organizations in the United States.275 Of 
these, 2,107 fit the criteria described above.276 810277 were from 
previously-regulated industries and the remaining 1297 were from 
previously-unregulated industries.278 
3.   (Three) Trends in Breach Incidence 
Analysis of breach incidence from January 1, 2000 (t0) through 
December 31, 2010 (tF) revealed three trends in periodic breach 
incidence. The first trend is an initially low (and not statistically 
significant) rate of reporting. This trend continues until 
approximately Summer 2004 (t1), and describes a period prior to the 
introduction of SBNs when organizations lacked incentives to report 
and therefore only minimal reporting (or other discovery) of security 
events occurred. 
The second trend comprises a substantial rise in reporting rates, 
lasting until approximately Summer 2008 (t2), and describes a period 
during which SBNs started to become effective in various states and 
organizations began reporting. During this period, reporting is 
assumed to be incomplete either because organizations experiencing 
incidents were not yet subject to SBNs or because they were unaware 
of the reporting requirements of SBNs. No useful data is currently 
available on the knowing disregard of reporting requirements, so this 
                                                                                                                 
practices. The interviews with CISOs, discussed in detail in Part IV, support this hypothesis. 
 273. If the Open Security Foundation data becomes available again, or another data source is 
developed, analysis of more recent years’ activity may be informative as to the effects of FTC 
enforcement as it gained awareness among organizations subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. 
 274. See supra note 250. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. 354 are from financial sector organizations, and 456 are from healthcare sector organizations. Id. 
 278. Id. 
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variable is assumed to be uniformly distributed and excluded from 
analysis. The mere presence of substantial regulation (and the 
legislative history behind the regulation, as discussed in Part II) 
suggests discounting the possibility that no incidents occurred prior 
to t1 as an explanation for this trend. 
The third trend comprises the period from t2 through the end of the 
analysis period (tF), and describes a period during which the 
incidence of reported breaches decreased. This period begins at the 
point (t2) at which organizations are believed to be aware of their 
reporting obligations under SBNs and all organizations required to 
report are doing so. 
Unlike most laws passed on a state-by-state basis, the triggering of 
a notification statute is based neither on the residence of the 
organization experiencing the breach nor on the location where the 
event took place. Rather, the triggering of a notification statute is 
based on the residence of individuals described in the lost data.279 
This information is a function of the composition of the dataset 
breached, and while the size (number of individuals whose 
information was compromised) is released under many SBNs, the 
composition of those individuals (i.e., their state of residence) is 
not.280 Thus, information about which states’ laws would be triggered 
is completely endogenous to each incident listed in the database.281 
Therefore unlike with traditional state-by-state analysis where one 
looks to the domicile of a firm to determine if it is affected by 
                                                                                                                 
 279. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(a) (West 2006) (requiring notification “to any customer 
who is a resident of New Jersey whose personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have 
been, accessed by an unauthorized person”); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303(a) (2006) (requiring 
notification to any resident of Pennsylvania). 
 280. Nor can the residence be inferred, because information about the residence of the individuals is 
neither broken out comprehensively by state under any individual state statute’s central reporting 
requirement nor do all states have centralized reporting requirements. Currently only 14 of 46 states 
with SBNs require centralized reporting (notably, New York’s statute does mandate centralized 
reporting). See State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41. 
 281. More specifically, such information is endogenous to the incident itself (as opposed to the record 
in the database) and is reported neither in the record in the database nor in the primary sources often 
cited in each record. While there are a (sparse) few incidents for which such information is reported, 
these represent only a fraction of overall incidents and are therefore not useful for addressing this 
problem. 
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regulation it is impossible for the outside observer to make such a 
determination. 
The inflection points t1 and t2, which demarcate the trends in 
breach incidence, are derived from polynomial regression analysis. 
Polynomial regression analysis allows a curve (as opposed to a 
straight line) of “best fit” to be determined for a set of data over an 
extended period of time. Comprehensive analysis of polynomials of 
orders 2 through 10 revealed that order 5 polynomials provided the 
statistically best fit for describing trends in breach incidence for 
organizations in both the PRE and PUE groups.282 The following 
figures depict the results of those regressions: 
 
Figure 1—Polynomial Regression Curve of Order 5 for PRE Breach 
Incidence 
 
                                                                                                                 
 282. A complete and comprehensive description of this analysis, the procedures used, and the results 
are discussed in another work. See Thaw, supra note 55, at apps. A–A.6. 
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Figure 2—Polynomial Regression Curve of Order 5 for PUE Breach 
Incidence 
 
While the points t1 and t2 vary slightly for PREs and PUEs, this 
variance is within an acceptable margin of error both for the 
regressions used and considering periodicity. This discrepancy 
therefore does not suggest treating the two categories separately for 
the purposes of analyzing the impact of regulation on security 
outcomes. 
B.   Blended Regulation is Optimal at Preventing Breaches 
Based on the trend periods established through the above methods, 
I conducted analysis comparing PREs and PUEs during these 
periods. The results suggest that a blend combining both directive 
regulation and Management-Based Regulatory Delegation is optimal 
for incentivizing organizations to employ security measures to 
prevent security breaches involving sensitive personal information. 
This analysis examines the period after SBN compliance reached 
saturation (t2). At this point, all firms reporting incidents are assumed 
to be aware they are subject to SBNs and reporting all applicable 
incidents in good faith. Firms are assumed to have strong incentives 
to reduce the number of reportable incidents they face. In addition to 
the negative public relations potential, some studies have reported 
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negative effects on stock price and firm performance following 
incident reports (although the data is admittedly mixed)283 and the 
interviews discussed in Part IV further suggest organizational 
incentives to avoid reporting.284 
Thus, if t2 represents the point at which no further increase in 
reporting will occur due to other organizations learning of their 
reporting obligations, it follows that from t2 through tF (and beyond) 
there should be a decreasing trend in breach incidence. This trend 
will primarily result from organizations taking security measures to 
reduce the number of reportable incidents they experience. 
Comparing the trends during this period between PREs and PUEs 
provides insight into the efficacy of directive regulation and 
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation at preventing breaches of 
personal information. 
With an established compliance saturation date for SBN reporting 
(t2), linear regression from this point can provide more detailed 
insight comparing these trends. The following figure and table depict 
the results of these regressions and their statistical significance:285 
                                                                                                                 
 283. See generally Alessandro Acquisti, Allan Friedman & Rahul Telang, Is There a Cost to Privacy 
Breaches? An Event Study (2006) (unpublished manuscript prepared for Twenty Seventh International 
Conference on Information Systems), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-
friedman-telang-privacy-breaches.pdf; Myung Ko & Carlos Dorantes, The Impact of Information 
Security Breaches on Financial Performance of the Breached Firms: An Empirical Investigation, 17 J. 
INFO. TECH. MGMT. 2 (2006), available at http://jitm.ubalt.edu/XVII-2/article2.pdf. 
 284. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 285. A complete and comprehensive description of this analysis, the procedures used, and the results 
are discussed in other work. Thaw, supra note 55, at 89–94. 
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Figure 3—Linear Regressions of PRE and PUE Breach Incidence 
from t2 to tF 
 
Statistical Data PRE Linear Regression 
(t2 to tF) 
PUE Linear Regression  
(t2 to tF) 
Residual Std. Error 3.759 (on 25 DF) 5.507 (on 28 DF) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.05776 0.4596 
p-value 0.1198 2.318 * 10-5 
Intercept [sig.] 29.87322 [*] 87.7074 [***] 
Coefficient x [sig.] -0.14957 [ ] -0.5884 [***] 
Significance Codes:  *** (0.001)   ** (0.01)   * (0.05)     . (0.1)    [blank] (1) 
Table—Summary of Key Statistical Information from Linear 
Regressions286 
 
The two sections that follow explain the implications of these 
trends for the regulatory efficacy and suggest why a blended 
regulation model is optimal at preventing breaches of personal 
information. 
                                                                                                                 
 286. The weaker statistical significance reported for the PRE regression line is due to periodicity 
selection effects. Observation of the (calendar) monthly incidence of breaches for PREs around the time 
of t2 indicates several outlier months. Additionally, testing not yet reported as of the time of this writing 
indicated stronger statistical significance with refined approaches to the period for grouping incidence. 
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1.   Blended Regulation Compared to Directive Regulation Alone 
The effects of blended regulation, or a combination of directive 
regulation and Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, are 
measured by the decreasing trend in breach incidence after t2 for 
PREs. After t2, PREs—generally healthcare and finance 
organizations—were subject not only to their respective forms of 
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation (HIPAA or GLBA), but 
also to the state SBNs.287 Like all organizations, they have an 
incentive to reduce their reportable incidents by implementing 
security measures to prevent reportable breaches. Thus, the 
downward trend (represented by the blue linear regression line in 
Figure 3) represents how rapidly PREs reduced their reportable 
incidents. 
The rate at which PREs reduced their reportable incidents was 
nearly four times less288 than the rate at which PUEs (represented by 
the red linear regression line in Figure 3) decreased their reportable 
incidents. At first glance, this might appear as though Management-
Based Regulatory Delegation was detrimental, as PREs reduced 
incidents at a slower rate than did PUEs. Paradoxically, however, the 
opposite is true. 
There is no evidence that organizations’ incentives to reduce 
security breach incidents vary by industrial sector. If there were such 
variance, however, it would likely indicate that the finance and 
healthcare sectors had higher incentives than the collective remainder 
of industry as those sectors traditionally handle more sensitive 
information. Additionally, there is no control data against which to 
compare breach incidence—thus there is no method to determine 
whether certain sectors were subject to more attacks than were other 
sectors. The compliance saturation point (t2), however, provides a 
method by which to infer comparative competency. 
                                                                                                                 
 287. See State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 41, for a current list of state SBNs. 
 288. As listed in Table 1, the slope of the PRE regression line was -0.14957 and the slope of the PUE 
regression line was -0.5884, representing a 3.9339 times greater rate of decrease. 
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If incentives and available resources to reduce breaches are equal, 
and there is a limited total reduction in breaches that can be achieved 
(perfect security is, as discussed above, impossible), then the rate of 
decrease after t2 will be inversely proportional to organizations’ prior 
effectiveness at preventing breaches. In other words, organizations 
already possessing information security competencies will experience 
a less rapid drop-off in breach incidence reporting after t2 because 
they had less far to improve (i.e., they were already some percentage 
of the way there). By contrast, organizations that had none or 
minimal information security measures in place prior to the influence 
of SBNs (at time t2) will experience a more rapid decrease (i.e., 
because they had “further to go”). 
Thus the results reported here suggest that the combination of 
directive regulation and Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, 
at least over the short term, may be as much as four times more 
effective at preventing breaches of personal information as is 
directive regulation alone. Over the longer term, the trends may 
suggest that both organizations will develop sufficient competencies 
(assuming the regulatory penalties are sufficient), however this 
finding has strong implications for any new subject of regulation 
seeking shorter-term efficacy. 
2.   Blended Regulation Compared to Management-Based 
Regulation Alone 
The effects of blended regulation, or a combination of directive 
regulation and Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, are 
measured by the decreasing trend in breach incidence after t2 for 
PREs. The decreasing trend in breach incidence suggests that 
organizations made efforts to improve their information security 
practices and reduce reportable security breach incidents. The fact 
that after t2 PREs still exhibited a decreasing rate of breach reporting 
suggests they still had “room to improve,” notwithstanding their prior 
experience being regulated by HIPAA and/or GLBA. 
While the exact degree of improvement is more difficult to 
quantify than the first comparison, due to the lack of a control group, 
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the decreasing trend clearly indicates the addition of directive 
regulation—specifically the SBNs—improved healthcare and finance 
organizations’ information security capabilities at preventing 
breaches of sensitive personal information. 
C.   Analytical Limitations and Future Research 
Before proceeding to suggest conclusions from this quantitative 
analysis, certain shortcomings should be noted. First, the analysis 
depends on comparing rates of change in reducing breach incidence. 
For the reasons discussed above, measuring relative rates of change 
is superior to measuring absolute values. However, the use of relative 
rates of change assumes a degree of consistency in organizational 
incentives to reduce breach reporting. While a facially reasonable 
assumption, when sufficient data is available to measure 
organizational incentives in this regard, the relative-rates-of-change 
analysis should be revisited.289 
Second, the linear regressions that form the basis for the rates-of-
change analysis depend on the selection of proper inflection points. 
As noted above, and as discussed further elsewhere,290 the 
polynomial regression approach employed to determine the inflection 
points likely provides reasonable estimates both of when 
organizations began to report incidents (t1) and of when organizations 
reporting reached “full compliance” (t2). However, randomized 
variation of these two values during the analysis process 
demonstrated that moderate variance can alter the comparative 
difference between the rates-of-change post-full-compliance. In all 
cases the PREs had a statistically significantly shallower slope (i.e., 
they still had “less far to go” and thus were likely “better prepared”); 
                                                                                                                 
 289. Pending ongoing availability of breach incidence data—which may be available from a new 
source now that the Open Security Foundation has stopped releasing its dataset (the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse is reviving its aggregation of this data, see https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach)—
the author anticipates proceeding with further analysis on rates-of-change with updated data. Even 
without other data on organizational incentives, additional time-series data on breach incidence is likely 
to provide further insight into the validity of the rates-of-change analysis approach. 
 290. See Thaw, supra note 55, at apps. A–A.6. 
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however, over a longer time frame this trend bears further 
investigation. 
Finally, this dataset—as with many datasets—may be subject to 
reporting bias. There is no evidence to suggest it is biased—rather the 
contrary—many incidents made it into the dataset before they were 
publicly reported pursuant to state Security Breach Notification 
laws.291 Nonetheless, the limitations of an informally-compiled 
dataset should be noted. As discussed elsewhere, to-date no better 
unclassified dataset exists for this analysis, and the author suggests 
that lawmakers and regulators may wish to encourage the collection 
of such information.292 
While these limitations do suggest the need for further research 
when better data becomes available, they do not limit the results of 
this analysis such that the conclusions are invalid. A finding, for 
example, of only twice the rate-of-change between PREs and PUEs 
would still suggest a substantial (and statistically significant) 
difference between the efficacy of the respective regulatory regimes. 
Thus the purpose of this section is to identify limitations and suggest 
future research to improve this work, not that the ultimate policy 
recommendations are necessarily weakened if the limitations here 
were ultimately found substantial. 
D.   Conclusions from Quantitative Analysis 
The quantitative analysis presented here suggests two conclusions. 
First, legislators and regulators should consider the addition of 
performance-based standards, through directive regulation, to 
                                                                                                                 
 291. The author is personally aware of such incidents, but cannot disclose further details without 
violating human subjects research protocols and/or attorney-client privilege. See infra note 300. 
 292. See Reporting Data Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th 
Cong. (July 18, 2013) (Testimony of David Thaw, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of 
Connecticut)). For an executive summary, see ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., Reporting Data 
Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?: Executive Summary of Written 
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existing regulatory regimes relying on forms of management-based 
regulation. In the United States, we have seen such activity in recent 
years, with the Department of Health and Human Services adding a 
breach notification requirement to HIPAA293 and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission issuing guidance suggesting that publicly-
traded companies disclose material security incidents in their 
quarterly filings.294 Outside the United States, regulators in areas 
such as Europe—which employ complex privacy and information 
security regulatory regimes, but as of yet do not have comprehensive 
breach notification requirements295—may wish to consider 
introducing such requirements. 
Second, the additional competency Previously Regulated Entities 
demonstrated suggests that regulators may wish to expand the reach 
of Management-Based Regulatory Delegation models to other 
industrial sectors. The FTC’s Section 5 privacy and information 
security enforcement jurisprudence may produce such an effect; 
however, it is primarily reactive. Some legislative proposals have 
been put forth to give the FTC prospective rulemaking authority in 
this regard,296 though none have yet gained traction. 
Outside the information security space, regulators may wish to 
consider blended regulation as an approach for two reasons. First, 
organizations previously subject to Management-Based Regulatory 
Delegation exhibit greater competency to adapt to new performance-
based or other prescriptive regulation when they are subsequently 
adopted.297 Second, the addition of performance standards may be 
used to achieve marginal improvements in key regulatory areas 
where a delegation model fails to achieve desired outcomes—such 
additions effectively grant regulators the flexibility to “nudge” 
                                                                                                                 
 293. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, § 13402, 123 Stat. 115, 260-63 (2009) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012)). 
 294. CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, Cybersecurity, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 13, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. 
 295. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 159, at 276. 
 296. See, e.g., Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA) of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. 
§§ 2(a)(1), 3(d)(3), 3(f)(2)(B), 4 (2011). 
 297. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
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regulated entities toward goals without removing entities’ discretion 
in heterogeneous industries. It is important to note, however, as 
discussed further in Part IV, that certain forms of directive regulation 
which specify means of performance (or means to avoid penalties) 
may actually reduce the discretion desired of management-based 
regulatory approaches.298 Regulators must consider this balance when 
adopting new forms of directive regulation to supplement existing 
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation. 
IV.   QUALITATIVE ACCOUNTS OF REGULATION AS DRIVING SECURITY 
A.   Views from Chief Information Security Officers 
In a field lacking substantial empirical data or other literature upon 
which to draw, qualitative methods may often form an effective tool 
to inform initial research directions. Chief Information Security 
Officers (CISOs) are the key individuals within large organizations 
responsible for directing the security policies and practices of the 
organization and advising senior management on decisions affecting 
security risk management. They are on the leading edge of 
implementing information security regulatory compliance objectives. 
The qualitative data comprises a series of two-hour semi-structured 
interviews with Chief Information Security Officers.299 These 
interviews were designed to provide insight and intuition about how 
regulatory models affect security practices and how those models 
bring about change. Given the absence of prior literature upon which 
to draw to formulate research questions, the results of these 
interviews served both as a direct data source and as a means to help 
develop the theoretical framework in Part II and the quantitative 
methods used in Part III. 
                                                                                                                 
 298. See infra Part IV. 
 299. A complete and comprehensive description of this analysis, the procedures used, and the results 
are discussed in other work. Thaw, supra note 55, at 94–107. 
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The requirements for protection of human subjects in research 
under federal guidelines300 require that an Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) review and approve of a protocol for the protection of human 
subjects prior to their participation in research. The overseeing IRB 
for the CISO interviews was the University of California, Berkeley’s 
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects (CPHS). The 
protocol approved by CPHS for this research project requires full 
anonymity of the subjects interviewed, as their responses have the 
potential to affect their employment adversely.301 Accordingly, while 
the author and his co-researchers maintain copies on-file of the 
transcripts, the author cannot disclose those transcripts, the identities 
of the subjects (beyond the general descriptions provided herein), or 
provide copies of the transcripts to the Georgia State University Law 
Review. 
Interview subjects were recruited from large organizations in the 
healthcare, finance, information systems and technologies, consumer 
products, and public utilities sectors. Interviewees needed to be the 
CISO of their organization or business unit, or the functional 
equivalent thereof. Selected subjects included CISOs of: 
1. a major computer hardware manufacturer; 
2. a major financial services provider; 
3. a major software and internet applications provider; 
4. a major telecommunications provider; 
5. a major research university (with a substantial medical 
research campus); 
6. a major healthcare services provider; 
7. a major health insurance carrier; 
8. a major pharmaceutical firm; and 
                                                                                                                 
 300. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat 342 (1974); Protection of Human 
Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2009); Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp (last visited Jan. 5, 2014). 
 301. Comm. for Prot. of Human Subjects, CPHS Application 5–7 (2007) (unpublished research 
project application materials, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with Georgia State University 
Law Review). 
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9. a major provider of healthcare information technology. 
The interviews were conducted over a two-year period through 
2008 and 2009. In addition to contributing to the theoretical 
framework and quantitative analysis, the results of the interviews 
yielded two direct findings. First, that directive regulation like SBNs 
decrease the importance of technical professionals302 within the 
organization, whereas Management-Based Regulatory Delegation 
like HIPAA, GLBA, and the FTC’s enforcement actions increase 
organizations’ reliance on technical professionals because such 
organizations’ general management appear to lack the technical 
expertise to make judgments as to “reasonableness” on technical 
matters.303 Second, that a lack of guidance from regulators defining 
“reasonableness” within the context of information security leaves 
CISOs unable to justify requests for additional resources or 
imposition of onerous security practices necessary to meet 
compliance obligations.304 
B.   Effects of Regulation on Organizational Roles: Locking The Bank 
or Vault Door and Leaving the Back Window Open 
The most desirable types of relationships between managers and 
professionals within organizations depend on the structure of the 
organization. Most of the organizations represented by the CISOs 
interviewed for this work employ structures based upon 
Fordist/Weberian “command-style” management hierarchies.305 
                                                                                                                 
 302. Within this context, the term “professional” refers to what law traditionally considers “learned 
professionals,” such as physicians, attorneys, accountants, engineers, and scientists. It specifically does 
not refer to vocationally trained technicians. Within the information security context, learned 
professionals generally would include senior management-level executives with a strong technical 
background and expertise tasked with planning and high-level advising, as opposed to vocationally-
trained technicians responsible for operating and configuring security technologies in response to high-
level directives. This distinction, while easily articulated, is admittedly difficult to draw in practice, in 
large part due to the lack both of formalized education in cybersecurity and of formalized licensure (as 
opposed to vocational certification) as discussed in Part II above. 
 303. Thaw, supra note 55, at 118. 
 304. See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 159, at 291. 
 305. See generally W. RICHARD SCOTT & GERALD F. DAVIS, ORGANIZATIONS AND 
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There are four conditions necessary for such organizations to 
function effectively. First, supervisors must be able to know when 
their subordinates are wrong about something.306 Second, supervisors 
must know how to correct subordinates’ mistakes.307 Third, 
subordinates must be fungible—there must be a market for other 
professionals of equal or greater ability to replace them.308 Fourth, 
and finally, the consequences of subordinates’ errors must be readily 
apparent and those consequences able to be connected to particular 
actions on the part of the subordinate.309 Modern organizations, 
however, have evolved to understand the need for senior managers to 
rely upon the judgment and discretion of technical professionals.310 
1.   Directive Regulation: SBNs Decrease Reliance on Technical  
Professionals 
Current SBNs—the predominant form of directive regulation in 
information security—exempt from the regulatory penalty of 
disclosure any security breach where the data compromised was 
encrypted.311 The result, as discussed earlier, is de facto means-based 
regulation under which regulated entities respond to the performance 
standard by adopting practices to ensure the penalty exception. As 
explained by one CISO of a large healthcare organization: 
                                                                                                                 
ORGANIZING 46–50 (2007). 
 306. These criteria were developed with Professor Todd LaPorte (University of California, Berkeley, 
Department of Political Science) and are partially derivative from the following works: SCOTT & DAVIS, 
supra note 305, at 124–82; JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 117–41 (2007). 
 307. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 305, at 124–82; THOMPSON, supra note 306, at 117-41. 
 308. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 305, at 124–82; THOMPSON, supra note 306, at 117-41. 
 309. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 305, at 124–82; THOMPSON, supra note 306, at 117-41. 
 310. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 305, at 148 (“[A]s levels of complexity, uncertainty, and 
interdependence increase, ‘independent’ professionals are likely to move their work into organizational 
structures, thus becoming components of a wider division of labor and increasingly subject to more 
formalized coordination mechanisms.”). 
 311. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b(a) (2006) (defining “breach of security” as 
“unauthorized access to or unauthorized acquisition of electronic files, media, databases or 
computerized data containing personal information when access to the personal information has not 
been secured by encryption or by any other method or technology that renders the personal information 
unreadable or unusable”) (emphasis added). 
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. . . [SBNs] caused us to . . . in a very short period of time, 
encrypt 40,000 laptops [with] whole disk encryption . . . .312 
The CISO of a large telecommunications company also described 
the move toward encryption: 
[W]hat we have done is all computers now have to be 
encrypted.313 
In total, 5 of the 9 respondents314 also identified SBNs as playing a 
substantial role in driving their information security practices. One 
respondent, from a financial services organization, remarked about 
the straightforward character of SBNs regulatory requirement: 
. . . [D]espite my reservations about [California’s breach 
notification law], on which most of the breach notification 
legislation has been modeled, it was exemplary in one 
regard . . . it was an extremely small piece of legislation.315 
Ironically, while this CISO found the simplicity appealing, it was 
this simplicity that decreased the need for managers to rely on 
technical professionals’ discretion and judgment. As stated by one 
CISO of a large healthcare organization: 
And so what’s been really interesting about the Notification 
Laws is [they] have come in and [ ] essentially reversed the 
whole direction security was taking from when I started this job. 
                                                                                                                 
 312. Thaw, supra note 55, at 97. 
 313. Id. 
 314. In the context of qualitative semi-structured interviews, this finding is significant. The interview 
structure did not specifically ask about SBNs, but rather—through a natural discussion style—
encouraged interviewees to discuss the subjects most relevant to them. Interviewees were, in fact, 
directly told that the researchers are here for them to tell what is most relevant to the interviewee. In this 
format, interviewees are likely to focus extensively on certain topics, and the fact that over half the 
interviewees focused on SBNs is a very significant finding. 
 315. Thaw, supra note 55, at 104. 
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[The original direction was] we’re going to figure out the privacy 
side of it . . . but we’re also going to build up capabilities to stop 
the cyber apocalypse because we’re worried about that sort of 
thing after September 11th and also because network security 
attacks are getting increasingly sophisticated. We have to build 
up the tools and the talents in our shops where we don’t have any 
of them and we can’t afford to pay [for] them. We have to do it 
ourselves.316 
This respondent describes a shift from an original direction where 
the security team “ha[d] to do it [them]selves” to a new, “reversed” 
direction.317 The respondent goes on to say: 
So what’s happened since the Notification Laws have become 
sort of ubiquitous in the last three years [is] the security 
investment is moved, essentially to crypto. If it moves, encrypt 
it. It if stays there, encrypt it. There’s not much reflection on 
whether or not actually anyone ever uses that data.318 
Here, the respondent describes the effect of directive regulation 
with performance standards tied to specific means (the SBNs) in 
decreasing their organization’s reliance on the professional’s exercise 
of discretion. This condition is well-suited to command-style 
hierarchies because clear, absolute standards (like the encryption 
exception in SBNs319) create measured outcomes by which managers 
can identify and correct the mistakes of subordinates.320 
                                                                                                                 
 316. Id.at 121–22. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. But note the lack of definition as to what constitutes “encryption.” Under the existing statutory 
language, a lost laptop containing two versions of a file with personal information, each of which was 
encrypted using Microsoft Office 2003’s implementation of RC-4, would likely satisfy the statutory 
definitions referenced supra note 138. This particular implementation of RC-4, while operating at a 128-
bit encryption key length, has a known vulnerability under which an attacker can break the encryption 
with minimal effort. Hongjun Wu, The Misuse of RC4 in Microsoft Word and Excel, CRYPTOLOGY 
EPRINT ARCHIVE (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/007. 
 320. See supra notes 306–09. 
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The result, as apparent from the quotes above, is a condition in 
which organizations (presumably at the direction of senior 
management) focus substantial energy on avoiding the regulatory 
penalty by adopting the means-based exception. It is important to 
note, however, that this condition may not be inconsistent with the 
original intent of the statutes—to protect sensitive consumer data and 
reduce incidence of identity theft.321 If data is properly encrypted, 
even if lost, it poses no plausible threat to consumers. 
This result, however, only focuses on one potential threat—
unencrypted data. If left to their professional discretion, CISOs might 
well (and probably would) choose to focus on multiple threats. 
2.   Management-Based Regulatory Delegation: HIPAA and GLBA 
Increase Reliance on Technical Professionals 
While perhaps better-suited to the most common types of 
organizational structures in place in the United States, directive 
regulation may pose other risks for the organization by reducing its 
capacity to leverage the flexibility afforded by Management-Based 
Regulatory Delegation. Though the addition of performance-based 
standards specifying specific means does not reduce the compliance 
obligations of management-based models, it may reduce the available 
resources to implement the compliance plans developed under those 
models. This resource limitation may contribute to a regulatory “race 
to the bottom.” 
Consider the advantages respondents identified afforded by the 
flexibility of a Management-Based Regulatory Delegation model, as 
described by the CISO of a large healthcare organization: 
They [the Department of Health and Human Services] stayed 
technology-neutral. They didn’t specify exact levels of 
                                                                                                                 
 321. See, e.g., Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA) of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(“To protect consumers by requiring reasonable security policies and procedures to protect 
computerized data containing personal information, and to provide for nationwide notice in the event of 
a security breach.”). 
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encryption. They didn’t specify exact methods of user 
authentication. A lot of that was in the proposed rule, and they 
very rightly took it out.322 
Another CISO similarly reported their experiences consulting with 
the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics: 
. . . meeting with some folks at NCVHS . . . because they have a 
mandate to report back to HHS to determine whether or not there 
ought to be any changes to the regulations . . . .And [we were 
discussing whether] to expand the scope of these safeguards to 
apply to de-identified data to avoid some of these risks that we 
[respondent’s organization] were open to it not only because we 
think we do those things today, but it might be an important 
thing to do from their standpoint and from a policy standpoint to 
ensure that it isn’t just the companies like ours that think about 
these things all the time, but that everybody is put on notice that 
this is a good practice.323 
All the CISOs interviewed from the finance and healthcare sectors 
expressed either a direct or indirect appreciation for their ability to 
participate in the rulemaking process for information security 
regulations. They remarked that the flexibility afforded by the 
regulations, in particular HIPAA, afforded them the ability to meet 
regulatory goals while still focusing on the security needs most 
salient to their organizations. 
Although highly favored by the respondents, regulation that 
encourages reliance on professional discretion is disruptive of 
command-style hierarchical relationships because it necessarily 
creates an environment in which managers both are unaware of and 
                                                                                                                 
 322. Thaw, supra note 55, at 120. 
 323. Id. at 115. HIPAA required—as part of its regulatory delegation component—that regulators 
consult with and, subject to limited exception, accept the recommendations of the NCVHS as part of the 
rulemaking process. See supra text accompanying note 110. See also David Thaw, Enlightened 
Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
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are unable to correct their subordinates’ (technical professionals) 
mistakes. The risk analysis and implementation details of information 
security are highly technical. It is nearly impossible for senior 
managers, charged with overseeing the operations of an entire 
organization, to maintain the knowledge necessary to correct their 
subordinates’ mistakes. 
This risk, however, must be considered against the risk of 
handicapping technical professionals’ ability to identify and address 
the most salient security risks. The analysis in this section suggests 
that the style of regulation substantially impacts the role and 
influence of technical professionals. To paraphrase one CISO, “we 
need tools and talents to defend against the cyber apocalypse 
(multiple threats) . . . and we can’t afford to pay for them.”324 Thus, if 
regulation’s impact on the role of technical professionals within 
organizations is ignored, regulators run the risk of ensuring the bank 
or vault door is well-secured (data is encrypted) and the back window 
is wide open (every other information security threat remains 
insufficiently addressed). I do not suggest that this risk is dispositive 
of increasing the use of directive regulation, only that its 
implementation should be considered with care to avoid the risks 
outlined here. Technology-neutral directive regulation, for example, 
or that which references standards developed (and perhaps more 
importantly, updated) by organizations like the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST), may provide steps toward such 
flexibility.325 
C.   Unreasonable Deficiencies in “Reasonableness:” Lack of Clarity  
Impedes Compliance Efforts 
When regulation weakens CISOs’ ability to exercise their 
professional judgment as to the greatest threats facing the 
                                                                                                                 
 324. Thaw, supra note 55, at 121–22. 
 325. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION 
STANDARD (AES), FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION 197 (2001), 
available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/fips-197.pdf. 
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organization, many salient risks may remain unaddressed. The result 
may be a “race to the bottom,” in which organizations adopt and 
implement compliance plans at the bare minimum level they believe 
will pass regulatory muster. This condition may result not as a 
function of intended regulatory evasion, but rather as a result of a 
redirection of resources to one specific threat (as described above) 
and an inability of the CISO to justify requests for additional funding 
due to a lack of specificity as to what constitutes “reasonable” in the 
context of regulatory requirements. 
Examples of this “race to the bottom” pervade regulatory 
enforcement actions. Many of the most notable FTC information 
security enforcement actions comprise security failures so 
irresponsible and obvious that the affected entities’ names have 
become synonymous with information security deficiency.326 Such 
low-hanging fruit continues to be available to regulators today.327 
Current information security regulation relies heavily on a concept 
of reasonableness—in developing compliance plans consistent with 
the Management-Based Regulatory Delegation models, organizations 
must make judgments regarding what constitutes “reasonable 
security.” This is particularly true for HIPAA compliance, where 
compliance obligations almost always scale to the size, scope, and 
complexity of the organization.328 
When combined, these factors yield a perfect storm for the 
regulatory “race to the bottom.” Directive regulation drives perhaps-
otherwise-sufficient security budgets toward specific compliance 
objectives, such as encryption. This, in turn, reduces the available 
resources for other security activities and forces CISOs to focus on 
meeting minimum compliance objectives rather than prioritizing the 
greatest threats they feel their organizations face. With an abundance 
                                                                                                                 
 326. In re TJX Cos., No. C-4227, 2008 WL 3150421, at *2–3 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008); In re BJ’s 
Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 WL 2395788, at *1–2 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005). Multiple CISO 
respondents specifically mentioned T.J. Maxx Cos. (TJX) when discussing security failures and the 
costs thereof, specifically associating the company with security deficiencies. 
 327. See, e.g., In re Twitter, Inc., No. C-4316, 2011 WL 914034 (F.T.C. Mar. 2, 2011). 
 328. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1173(d), 
110 Stat. 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2006)). 
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of low-hanging fruit available to regulators—even if likely through 
malfeasance, not misfeasance—the bar is set extremely low. Thus, 
regulators are faced with an industry standard set perhaps below their 
optimal level. As long as low-hanging fruit remains available to 
regulators, CISOs will not be able to justify requests for new 
resources on the grounds that peer organizations with comparable 
policies have been subject to enforcement action. Nor will they be 
able to justify requests based on the regulations themselves, as 
“reasonable” lacks an operational definition any higher than the low-
hanging fruit provided by cases such as B.J.’s Wholesale Club,329 T.J. 
Maxx Cos.,330 and Twitter.331 And so the cycle continues. 
This analysis strongly suggests the conclusion that regulators 
provide more proactive guidance as to what constitutes “reasonable” 
standards for security practice. This is, perhaps, not as difficult a 
challenge as some of the CISO respondents might suggest. While 
including exact encryption specifications in the promulgated 
regulations is likely inefficient, referencing current standards on 
encryption, such as those promulgated by NIST, provides an 
excellent, flexible, and adaptive solution.332 Developing standards is 
among NIST’s core competencies, and it publishes Federal 
Information Processing Standards on a wide variety of topics,333 
including encryption.334 Some legislative proposals have considered 
giving the FTC proactive rulemaking authority with respect to 
information security.335 Such federal legislation may be well-served 
to instruct the Commission that its rulemaking reference standards 
clarifying concepts of reasonableness within information security. 
Regulators in other substantive areas facing a structurally similar lack 
                                                                                                                 
 329. BJ’s Wholesale Club, 2005 WL 2395788. 
 330. TJX Cos., 2008 WL 3150421. 
 331. Twitter, Inc., 2011 WL 914034. 
 332. See ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD, supra note 325. 
 333. Computer Security Resource Center, Publications, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsTC.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2013). 
 334. ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD, supra note 325. 
 335. Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA) of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), 3(d)(3), 
3(f)(2)(B), 4 (2011). 
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of clarity as to reasonableness may benefit from such approaches as 
well. 
CONCLUSION 
Three important conclusions follow from this Article. First, 
blended regulation—a mixture of Management-Based Regulatory 
Delegation and directive regulation—is superior at driving firms to 
implement information security practices that will prevent security 
breaches than is either regulatory model alone. This is a particularly 
important finding for regulators, both domestically and 
internationally. Domestically, since conducting the CISO interviews, 
we have seen the implementation of a breach notification 
requirement by the Department of Health and Human Services and 
guidance promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
that publicly-traded companies disclose material information about 
security risks to investors.336 Internationally, the European Union has 
begun to consider breach notification requirements as well.337 
Massachusetts promulgated regulations in 2010 that bear some 
resemblance to the Management-Based Regulatory Delegation 
models found in HIPAA, GLBA, and the FTC’s enforcement, and 
other states and federal regulators in other industrial sectors may 
wish to do so as well.338 Thus, in summary, legislators and regulators 
considering information security measures may wish to evaluate 
whether a comprehensive approach to information security 
regulation—as opposed to a piecemeal approach—is appropriate. 
Second, the concept of Management-Based Regulatory 
Delegation—a deliberate choice by the legislature to heavily encode 
regulatory capture both in the administrative rulemaking process and 
in the compliance process—clearly affords advantages (efficacy at 
achieving the regulatory goal of preventing security breaches), but 
                                                                                                                 
 336. 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, pt. 164 (2013); CF Disclosure Guidance, supra note 294. 
 337. Commission Regulation 611/2013, 2013 O.J. (L. 173) 2. 
 338. 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01 to -.05 (2010). 
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also incurs risk of a “race-to-the-bottom” in compliance standards. 
The preliminary data presented by the CISO interviews suggests that 
blended regulation, by layering on specific directive regulatory goals, 
may somewhat abate the risks of this deliberate regulatory capture. 
Further study of this concept certainly is warranted. 
Finally, the use of information disclosure-based regulation to 
achieve the effect of directive legislation is an interesting concept. 
There is no evidence that when the California Legislature considered 
the first Security Breach Notification law, it envisioned an “encrypt 
everything” directive as the result. Yet that appears to have become 
the industry standard, at least for the foreseeable future. This “choice 
of compliance” approach to regulation may present regulators in 
other fields with an interesting option when heavy-handed traditional 
directive regulation is undesirable, but disclosure-based regulation 
where industries can “sort out for themselves the best approach” is 
more amenable.  
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